


Marine Corps Gazette

JULY 1953

THIRTY CENTS



ETERNAL VIGILANCE IS
THE PRICE OF LIBERTY

Marine Corps Gazette

JULY 1953


NUMBER 7

VOLUME 37

PROFESSIONAL MAGAZINE FOR UNITED STATES MARINES

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COVER

For Independence Day it might be well for all of us to remember what John Philpot Curran said in 1790 in his speech, *The Right Of Election*. "The condition upon which God hath given liberty to man is eternal vigilance." Our cover, by Corporal Chris Magalos, is a symbolic interpretation of Mr. Curran's quotation. The back cover, by Corporal T. E. Head of the MCS photo section, shows newly commissioned Basic School students marching past the Iwo Jima Memorial at the entrance to Marine Corps Schools.

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“What will the telephone
be like
when I grow up?”

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FIELD EXPEDIENT—It required only a few minutes for this big Army H-19 Sikorsky helicopter to lift and place a prefabricated control tower into position atop an airfield-

operations building in Korea. The Sikorsky was called when a conventional crane tried and failed to do the job. Regular work of Army H-19s is transportation and supply.

AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS



HIGH HAUL—In rugged British Columbia, a 50-mile power line is being built to serve an Aluminum Company of Canada plant at Kitimat. Work on this project has been enormously speeded by S-55s, flown by Okanagan Helicopters, Ltd., which can airlift almost everything needed to virtually inaccessible construction sites.



PROBLEM SOLVER—Operation of eight factories in eight Ohio and Pennsylvania cities presented unusual transportation problems for executives and staff members of Rockwell Manufacturing Company, Pittsburgh. Now a new Sikorsky S-55 helicopter is in operation, providing fast, practical transportation to and from the outlying plants.



RESEARCH TEAM-MATE—A new Sikorsky S-55 helicopter is the latest addition to Sperry Gyroscope Company's large flight research department at MacArthur Field, Long Island. This versatile aircraft will be used as a flying laboratory, helping Sperry engineers test and develop improved instruments and other equipment for navigation and flight control.

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message center

Add to Fox Hill

Dear Sir:

I wish to add my voice to the chorus of approval that must have arisen by now for Capt R. C. McCarthy's *Fox Hill* in the March issue.

... The article reminds me specifically of several small addenda that may interest GAZETTE readers, to wit:

Some of Capt Barber's men told me their skipper, refusing to leave his company after he had been wounded, went on a special "diet"—a judiciously rationed bit of morphine for breakfast each morning thereafter, to keep the pain down as infection threatened, yet not enough to dull his senses.

Several men said How Battery's excellent extreme-range fire proved that Marine artillery "speaks louder than a Chinese first sergeant"—because on occasion during night attacks, Fox men would hear the Chinese blowing their whistles as a signal to form up for the assault, only to have the whistles drowned out by the crash of How's shelling. I hope Lt Campbell has had or will have the credit deservedly his for an excellent job as artillery FO.

A sergeant of Fox Co led a successful "rescue" of a machine gun which the Chinese momentarily captured, first telling his men to use rifles only—no grenades allowed—because he didn't want the machine gun damaged. They got the gun back in fine shape.

Men wounded once and even twice, in some cases, went back to the perimeter because they would know, there, what was going on. They trusted their buddies but figured they should be on the line to fight off the Chinese in case a buddy fell asleep from exhaustion.

The first night, when the company CP displaced up the hill, the Chinese apparently got into some Christmas mail packages that hadn't been distributed as yet because of the unexpected move from Hagaruri. Subsequent events proved that

the Chinese made an egregious error when they messed with a Leatherneck's Yuletide "pogey bait!"

I was sent to the 7th Marines as a combat correspondent soon after the division arrived at Masan, in the week or ten days following Fox Company's stand, to gather loose ends on the story. There I asked Col (now BrigGen) Litzenberg, who then commanded the 7th Marines, whether it was true that Capt Barber was being recommended for the



Medal of Honor. He told me that if Capt Barber's battalion commander had not as yet initiated such recommendation he would see to it personally—which made it plain to me that Capt Barber's whole regiment, from the top on down, regarded his action as deserving the highest honor the nation can bestow on any man. The fact that Capt Barber subsequently received the Medal of Honor surprised nobody.

As long as there are Marines like Fox Company's officers and men, the Corps can count on living up to—and sometimes even surpassing—all past glories. And the nation can count on the Corps.

GEORGE S. CHAPPARS
MSgt, USMCR

Pittsburgh, Pa.

Additional Roads

Dear Sir:

Capt Morrison's article, *Ten Roads To A Commission*, was very enlightening and quite timely. However, he overlooked one route to a commission... the Naval Aviation Cadet (NAVCAD) program.

The cadet program is open to civilians and enlisted men under 27 years of age with a high school education. Flight training is 18 months long and at its conclusion the cadet may be appointed a reserve second lieutenant as a naval aviator. During the course of instruction, cadets may state their preference for the Marine Corps, and recently most who have applied have been accepted. The usual tour of active duty is required, with integration, if desired, ... a distinct possibility.

ROGER W. PEARD
1stLt, USMC

Edenton, N. C.

Dear Sir:

... Qualified enlisted men and college students will find the NAVCADS to be an excellent approach to a commission... and to a career in aviation.

As in the case of the Naval Academy, initial recruitment and training are through the Navy, but a percentage of the commissions earned are in the Marine Corps Reserve.

R. J. OFSTAD
LtCol, USMC

Alexandria, Va.


Dear Sir:

... There was nothing mentioned

Each month the GAZETTE pays five dollars for each letter printed. These pages are intended for comments and corrections on past articles and as a discussion center for pet theories, battle lessons, training expedients, and what have you. Correspondents are asked to keep their communications limited to 200 words or less. Signatures will be withheld if requested; however the GAZETTE requires that the name and address of the sender accompany the letter as an evidence of good faith.



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WESTERN AIR LINES

in the article about the NAVCAD program. . . .

DONALD ST. DENIS
Cpl, USMCR

Syracuse, N. Y.

Dear Sir:

. . . Actually, there are 11 roads to a commission. Composing the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps program are two groups; the NROTC Regular and the NROTC Contract. Both groups take the same college courses in naval science but the similarity ends there.

The NROTC Contract receives a monthly retainer pay during his last two years of college and goes one summer to Quantico, Va. for training. Graduation is accompanied by a second lieutenant's commission in the Marine Corps Reserve and, in times of national emergency, the NROTC Contract graduate may be called to active duty for two years.

In the case of the second group, the NROTC Regular attends college under the Holloway Plan, receiving the benefits of a full four-year academic scholarship. His sophomore

and junior summers are spent on midshipman cruises with the Navy before going to Marine Corps Schools for a summer's training. Commissioning as a Marine Corps second lieutenant follows graduation, and the NROTC Regular enters Basic School.

D. D. CHAPLIN, III
1stLt, USMC

Quantico, Va.

Dear Sir:

. . . Students who hold the appointment of a midshipman, USNR during the four-year college training period are commissioned in the regular Marine Corps. . . .

PAUL J. OTIS
Mid'n 2/c, USNR

Holy Cross College

Dear Sir:

. . . An NROTC student may also receive a commission in the regular Marines. . . .

THOMAS D. KENNEDY
New Orleans, La.
Ed: Sorry we missed the NAVCAD program and the road to a regular commission through the NROTC program.

Dear Sir:

. . . I wonder about the last paragraph on page 18. All promotion material that we've seen on the PLC program indicates that it is open to college freshmen, sophomores, and juniors. . . .

Could this have been a typographical error? . . .

ARTHUR H. FLINT, JR.
1stLt, USMCR

Tucson, Ariz.

Ed: We can't blame the mistake on the long-suffering typographers, or Capt Morrison either—it was strictly an editorial error. A man can join until the end of his junior year providing he can still complete one summer's training prior to his senior year.

Practical Equipment

Dear Sir:

I agree heartily with Capt Ludwig's remarks concerning the rucksack in *Re-pack Your Troubles*. I have travelled a lot by bicycle in the Balkans. . . The rucksack was my suitcase, my briefcase, and my pack. It seldom contained less than a light blanket, an extra pair of shoes, toilet articles, an assortment of books, a loaf of black bread, a long stick of

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
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F. NOVAK
Maj, USA

Berlin, Germany

Removing the Vest

Dear Sir:

On your prize-winning photo and cover of the February issue, one discrepancy in first-aid technique should be pointed out. The man is cutting off the "flak" jacket from the shoulders while it should and can, in all cases, be cut up the seams from the sides. That way it will not be rendered useless and the protective vest may find renewed use.

THOMAS L. McCANN
HM3, USN

Korea

Correction Please

Dear Sir:

It is written in the 26th verse of the 24th Chapter of St. Matthew, "... I reap where I sowed not, and gather where I have not strewed." Lest this same be written of me, it is necessary to set the record straight in *Our Authors* in the April GAZETTE. Col Chauncey G. Parker, Jr., during World War II held the highest billets ever held by a Marine in Selective Service, having been a division chief, assistant deputy director, and deputy director on the National Headquarters level.

ROBERT H. RANKIN
LtCol, USMC

Des Moines, Iowa

Ed: LtCol Rankin's post is the highest in the Selective Service system now held by a Marine.

Accessories and Esprit

Dear Sir:

I stand in strong favor of bringing back the Sam Browne belt, campaign hat, and high-top dress shoe of which CWO E. C. Needham and SSgt L. W. Horgan wrote in the April issue.

My father and the late Lou Dia-

mond were good friends and often expounded on the cutting up of the Marine uniform. Everyone that knew Lou Diamond can understand how he used to voice his opinion on this subject—slightly milder than an earthquake.



I believe that the articles mentioned above will help esprit de corps and will enhance the finest uniform in the world.

WILLIAM T. GLADMAN
Cpl, USMC

Hyattsville, Md.

Dear Sir:

Something like 30-odd years ago, while I was still a recruit, I heard a sergeant who was a veteran of Nicaragua, Vera Cruz, Haiti, and Belleau Wood say, "The Marine Corps ain't what it used to be." And I heard a gunnery sergeant whose campaigns included those mentioned and also the Philippine Insurrection and the Boxer Uprising remark, "No, and it never was."

I did not quite understand his meaning, although in my company there was a decrepit corporal who had served aboard the USS *Maine* when she was blown up a year before I was born. He lived in a mild state of resentment because his long blue coat with red collar and shoulder scales and helmet with a brass spike were not currently acceptable as a liberty uniform. However, the passing years have brought me to a better perspective, and I am tremendously impressed by the wave of nostalgia now being manifest in behalf of the field hat, high-top shoes and—why not condiment cans?

I would like to see a poll taken on field hats, the only persons eligible to vote being those whose first enlistment in the Marine Corps antedated the abolition of the field hat by at least five years. To those of us who had to wear that hat for general duty, it was heavy, subject to every jungle branch and thorn, kept the hair wet with sweat, became utterly shapeless, and permitted icy rain water to trickle down behind the ears through the head-strap eyelets. Oh

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
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MAIL TO: MARINE CORPS GAZETTE
BOX 106, MCS, QUANTICO, VA.

yes, we all had one carefully nurtured, rakish affair (I still have mine, over 30 years old). I can't seem to remember that we in tropical garrisons thought so much of it and usually wore a barracks cap when we could and the cloth garrison cap when it was authorized for night wear. The only place for the field hat is the rifle range, and today a utility cap can take its place.

Let's start a campaign to wrap trouser legs tightly when wearing leggings. The Marine Corps ain't what it used to be with these baggy sailor-pants effect! Or maybe old Jack O'Briend was right about the spiked helmet.

FREDERICK W. HOPKINS

MSgt, USMC

Camp Pendleton, Calif.

Dear Sir:

In reading the April GAZETTE I see CWO Needham's plug for bringing back the officer's Sam Browne belt.

By all means let's do it. We have the sword and swagger stick back, so let's at least make the Sam Browne optional.

In my opinion (and everyone I talk with shares it) it "makes" the uniform. . . .

CHARLES A. DYER

1stLt, USMC

San Francisco, Calif.

Gazette in Korea

Dear Sir:

The GAZETTE has continued to give me good professional reading material where I could use it most—in Korea with the division in the field. It has helped me both as an instructor here in the division NCO school and as a platoon sergeant and guide while I was on line . . .

H. W. CATES, JR.

SSgt, USMC

Korea


Re-rigging the FDC

Dear Sir:

LtCol Wood pointed out the need for an improved battalion fire direction center tent in *Rigged for Combat* in the April GAZETTE. Baker Co, 1st Armored Amphibian Bn was faced with the same problem in Korea, and Capt L. E. Bolts and 1stLt C. A. Cothran came up with an expedient which may be a solution to the colonel's problem. They

modified an LVT3C slightly by installing hinged pieces of plywood large enough to accomodate firing charts on the inside bulkheads on either side of the cargo compartment. Hooks and receptacles for communication and fire direction equipment were conveniently located. The dome light in the cargo compartment provided some light but was augmented by Coleman lanterns.

This arrangement proved satisfactory for an FDC controlling two batteries, and accommodated six men quite easily. When the company moved into a new position, the LVT-3C would proceed to the location designated by the company commander, lower the ramp (covering the ramp opening with a tarpaulin when necessary), and be ready for operation in an incredibly short time. What's more, the key personnel of the company were afforded light armor protection from enemy artillery fire.



I suggest that two LVT3Cs be assigned to each artillery battalion for use by the fire direction center. These vehicles could be modified as the artillery sees fit, and methods could be devised for improving the lighting, ventilating, and heating facilities. LVT3Cs are capable of traversing any terrain that can be negotiated by trucks, with the possible exception of narrow mountain roads, and can go many places that trucks cannot. Perhaps the track grousers could be modified so that the vehicles would not tear up roads.

Admittedly, the LVT3C is an expensive piece of equipment, but it appears doomed for obsolescence anyway with the introduction of the new LVTP5. And considering the FDC trucks that it will replace and the increased mobility, efficiency, protection, and comfort provided, the results seem well worth the expense.

R. H. PIEHL

Capt, USMC

Quantico, Va.

Our authors

Yoshitaka Horie had authentic background for his *Defense Plan For Chichi Jima* (page 36). Mr. Horie was there. As a major and a general staff officer in the Imperial Japanese Army, he helped plan the defense of Iwo Jima under the late General Kuribayashi, and then was assigned duty on Chichi Jima, where he assisted in setting up a defense for the attack that never came. Mr. Horie was graduated from the Japanese Military Academy and the Imperial War College, and served as liaison officer between the Japanese Army and Navy prior to his service on Iwo Jima. At the present time he is general manager for the New Tachikawa Aircraft Co in Japan. He learned his English, he writes us, "from American flyers shot down on Chichi Jima."



MR. HORIE

Capt Richard H. Kern, who announces good news for communicators with *Tactical Radio—Family Style* (page 25), joined the Marine Corps in 1942 and has been in communications continuously except for one year of inactive duty (1946) while he did post-graduate work in history at Montana University. He majored in journalism at Montana before receiving his commission, and during World War II he was with the III Corps Signal Battalion during the Okinawa campaign. From August 1950 to August 1951 he served as a communications officer with the 1st Mar Div in Korea. Captain Kern is now instructing at the Communication Officers' School, Quantico.



CAPT KERN

From his position as instructor in Plebe English at the Naval Academy, 1stLt Harold D. Fredericks sent us *Skipper With Two Hats* (page 32). Awarded the Silver Star and the Purple Heart for service and wounds received in Korea, he held a variety of jobs while serving with the 1st Mar Div. From April 1950 to March 1951, he was successively a rifle platoon leader, H&S company commander, and S-1 with the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines.




1STLT FREDERICKS

We're sure that the letters to follow Major William D. Armstrong's *The Pilot For The Job* (page 41) will spice up our *Message Center* for some time to come. But before you take pen in hand to answer what should turn out to be a highly controversial article, we feel you should know that Major Armstrong was a fighter pilot with VMF-123 at Guadalcanal, and with VMF-512, flying off a carrier during the Okinawa operation. Then for the hot-bloods who wish to dismiss World War II, check the fact that the major has recently returned from a tour as a fighter pilot with VMF-212 in Korea, and wears the DFC with one star and the Air Medal with 10 stars.



MAJ ARMSTRONG

We've said all we can about Lynn Montross, author of *Red China On The Offensive* (page 16) in previous issues of the GAZETTE. Mr. Montross has written numerous articles for us in the past and we hope he will continue to let us have more of his material in the future. For old hat, we might add that he is still a historian with the Historical Branch G-3, HQMC.



MR. MONTROSS

When Captain Bill Parham enlisted, the Marine Corps was smaller than the New York City police department. That was in 1932, and in his *Machines Fill The Billet* (page 52) the captain points out that the personnel accounting methods used in those days could not be adapted to a Corps expanded to 10 times its former size. After Boot Camp at Parris Island, Captain Parham spent five-and-a-half years aboard the USS *Mississippi*, and a check of old muster rolls will bear out that he rose to the rank of sergeant during this period of sea duty. Clerical school and a tour at San Diego followed. He returned to sea aboard the USS *Enterprise* in December 1941, as a first sergeant and battery officer of 20mm gun batteries. While aboard he participated in seven Pacific raids and received a promotion for meritorious conduct in action. He was appointed Marine Gunner in 1943, and subsequently served in San Francisco, China, Camp Pendleton, and HQMC. When we punched the IBM machine and checked his card the other day we found that he is now machine accounting officer at Hqs, FMFPac.



CAPT PARHAM

Harbord and Lejeune: A Command Precedent (page 12) was written by LtCol Harry W. Edwards who now heads the Marine Corps' Historical Branch. LtCol Edwards came into the Marine Corps from the University of Minnesota in 1941, and served through the Guadalcanal and Bougainville campaigns prior to his tour of Embassy duty in London from 1944 to 1946. Before going to Korea in 1951, he was an instructor at TTUPac, and I&I of the 14th Infantry Battalion at Houston, Texas. While in Korea, LtCol Edwards was assistant G-3 of the 1st Mar Div and CO of the 1st Shore Party Bn. USMC



LTCOL EDWARDS



Harbord and Lejeune:


“I CAN GIVE YOU NO BETTER command in France than to let you succeed General Doyen with the Marines.”

This was General Pershing's way of introducing his chief of staff, Brigadier General James G. Harbord, to his new command assignment, that of the 4th Marine Brigade, one May day in 1918. Pershing might have added that he could give the Marines no better leader in view of the confidence he placed in General Harbord; a confidence born of close association since

May of '17. And it was this period of association that had seen the A.E.F. in France grow from less than one hundred men to a half million.

This first year in France had been a difficult period, not only because of the many problems involved in shifting a large army across the seas into a foreign land, but also the necessity of proving the worth of that army. All the French really wanted by way of an army from America was infantry and machine guns to be integrated into their own divisions. To convince them that America

could provide something besides warm bodies was one of Pershing's most trying jobs. And by the same token, the general was not about to settle for a role in the war that permitted the French to rule his ranks and dispose of his troops without the intervention of American command and staff organization. France was justly proud of her Napoleon and de Villars and l'Ecole Militaire, but so was America proud of her Grant and Lee and fast-developing military tradition. Facts spoke loudly at the conference table.



France wanted only men and guns to fill her thinning ranks.

Two great generals proved that America had something else to offer

A Command Precedent

Naturally, Pershing was proud of his 4th Marine Brigade which comprised the 5th and 6th Marine Regiments with attached 6th Machine-Gun Battalion, and formed a component of the Army 2d Division. They comprised an elite group, officered by future leaders of the Corps — Shepherd, Holcomb, Cates, Lejeune, Neville, Catlin, Hunt, Rockey, and Smith, to name but a few. There were luminaries of the sport world also: Bastian and Martineau of Minnesota, Lagore and Maynard of Yale, Moore and Murphy of Princeton,

and many more. Indeed, one regiment included 60 percent college men within its ranks. Little wonder that they made such a fine showing in early training with the Alpine Chasseurs ("Blue Devils") in their brigade and regimental inspections, and in their initial deployment near Verdun before going on to later achievements that won them lasting fame.

Picture, if you will, the feelings that went through General Harbord's mind as he journeyed to the command post of the 4th Marine

By LtCol H. W. Edwards



Brigade. The incumbent, Brigadier General Doyen, had been relieved for reasons of ill health (he died three months later), and the Marines had no brigadier for replacement. Harbord, as he relates in his memoirs, had misgivings as to how well he would be received by his new command. Here he was wearing the "Mex" rank of brigadier with little field experience about to take charge of two regimental commanders, both regulars, and each wearing a Medal of Honor. However, he was buoyed by Pershing's confidence in him and the natural eagerness with which a staff officer reacts to a command assignment.

The warmth of the welcome from Colonel Wendell Neville of the 5th Marines and Colonel Albertus Catlin of the 6th dispelled any doubts General Harbord might have had about his new assignment. His brigade staff included an administrative officer, Major Holland M. Smith, who was to make his mark on Pacific coral in later years.

● HARBORD FOUND little time for shaking down, as movement orders arrived on 30 May which took the brigade into the valley of the Marne.

French refugees blocked the roads in their flight ahead of a steadily advancing German Army. These were dark days in France. Almost a million people had deserted Paris; the British had suffered a severe loss; the defeatists were crying for an honorable peace. Into the breach went the Marine brigade as part of the 2d Army Division. The French Army was in retreat but a typical reaction of the Marines was Captain Lloyd Williams' countermand to a French order to withdraw, which history has recorded as, "Retreat Hell—we just got here." And they stood fast.

The Germans were stopped cold by accurate rifle and machine-gun fire since division artillery had not yet arrived. Then the brigade assumed the offensive and used up four German divisions in the process while capturing 1,000 prisoners. The brigade's objectives were Belleau Wood and Bouresches. These were seized on the 6th of June, now recorded as the date Paris was saved. The cost of Marine casualties was severe with some 670 killed and 3,721 wounded. The 2d Battalion of the 5th Marines came out of the fight

with seven officers and 350 men, all that remained of 30 officers and 1,000 men two weeks previously. War correspondent Floyd Gibbons, grievously wounded in the same action, was permitted by a sympathetic censor to file his story and thus identified the Marines' victory to an electrified America.

The thanks of a grateful French people was some recompense for American losses. They declared the Marine's defensive stand of the Aisne-Marne one of the greatest in history. Citizens kissed the Marines on the streets, but official recognition came in yet another way—the order

issued on 30 June 1918 by General Degoutte, commanding France's Sixth Army:

"In view of the brilliant conduct of the Fourth Brigade of the Second United States Division, which in a spirited fight took Bouresches and the important stronghold of Belleau Wood, stubbornly defended by a large enemy force, the General commanding the Sixth Army orders that henceforth, in all official papers, the Bois de Belleau shall be named "Bois de la Brigade de Marine."

The 5th and 6th Marine Regiments and the 6th Machine-Gun Battalion were decorated with the



For Belleau Wood and Bouresches — the gratitude of a people

Croix de Guerre with palm to denote a citation in Army Orders. Subsequent decorations of the Croix de Guerre with gilt star and palm earned these organizations the coveted French Fourragere to be worn as a part of the uniform by all members.

With the success General Pershing had received a powerful boost at the conference table with his French and British colleagues. No longer would there be doubt as to whether American troops could operate successfully with their own staffs and with sector responsibility. The man from overseas was no longer untried; he had fought and won.

It was indeed a proud Harbord who stepped up to receive his second star on the 4th of July, albeit saddened by the thought of leaving his gallant brigade. No doubt the memories of Sergeant Major John Quick, First Sergeant Dan Daly, Major Bert Sibley, and other heroes of the brigade were echoing through his mind as he bade farewell to his comrades-in-arms. He had come to love the emblem of the globe and anchor on his collar as dearly as his crossed sabres of the cavalry. The surprise farewell from several hundred Marines to the strains of the Marine Hymn played by the 6th Marines' band was indeed a moving tribute.

GENERAL HARBORD had found the brigade's esprit de corps unexcelled by that of any other organization; its proof of valor unsurpassed by any other outfit of comparable size in history. His relationship, though brief, led him to remark, "I look back upon my service with the Marine brigade with more pride and satisfaction than on any other equal period of my long army career."

This feeling of affection and respect was reciprocated by the brigade. It set the stage for Marine Major General John A. Lejeune to take command of the 2d Division on 28 July 1918 and lead that organization to victory over the battlefields of St. Mihiel, Blanc Mont, and Meuse-Argonne. However, before the succession in command, General Harbord was to win his spurs as commander of the 2d Division at Soissons and thereby enhance his already fine reputation.

It was on the night of 16 July that the division moved into position for

an attack the next morning at dawn, with no previous opportunity for reconnaissance. The French reckoned speed and surprise to be of the essence in view of the Germans strongly entrenched positions and great strength. The pay-off was a brilliant victory. All three division objectives were captured by evening of D-day, culminating a five-mile advance. The attack the next day did not have benefit of the element of surprise but was none the less effective against determined resistance. A dangerous salient at Soissons was eliminated and another proof established for the quality of American arms, this time on a corps level.

THE NEXT STEP up the ladder was the creation of an American field army. This Pershing accomplished in August; a final recognition of America as a fighting power capable of holding her own on any foreign battlefield.

The rotation of General Harbord from field command to the Service of Supply paved the way for the Marine's General Lejeune to step up from the 4th Brigade to command the 2d Division; an historic precedent of inter-service command. The Marine Corps had indicated a desire to form its own division but Pershing would not permit his 2d Division team to be changed.

As a proving ground for his new First American Field Army, General Pershing chose the St. Mihiel salient, considered by the French to be impregnable.

The Germans had come to know the 2d Division by this time and referred to them in captured documents as "shock troops." Yet another captured document further honored the Marines with the appellation, *Teufelhunden* ("Devil Dogs"). Both organizations lived up to their advance billing as they swept through the German defense lines on the first day to seize objectives which had been selected for the second day, and in the doing to capture over 3,200 prisoners.

After two weeks' rest the division again went into action on 28 September in the Champagne offensive. It was in seizing the Blanc Mont ridge and breaching the Hindenburg Line that the Marines and doughboys of the Second had some of the toughest fighting of the entire war. It took five days of battle to clear



the Germans out of Rheims, and the division suffered nearly 5,000 casualties in the process of using up nine enemy divisions. This victory was one of the most decisive of the war. It was a proud General Lejeune who on October 11, addressed his command: "To be able to say when this war is finished, 'I belonged to the 2d Division, I fought with it at the battle of Blanc Mont ridge,' will be the highest honor that can come to any man." As if to lend emphasis to his words, General Lejeune established the star and Indian-head insignia for his organization so that its members might always be identified. This symbol has been perpetuated to the present time.

Official recognition for their achievement at Blanc Mont came for the entire division in a citation in French Army Orders.

Unfortunately, an organization can not rest long on its laurels when there is still a war in progress. November 1st became yet another Dog day for the weary 2d Division, and the battle of Meuse-Argonne was effectively joined. This action destroyed the last stronghold of the Hindenburg Line in a six-mile advance that sent the enemy in full retreat and contributed in no small measure to the final collapse that resulted in an armistice on the eleventh.

Praise came from many quarters for the work done by the 2d Division. General Lejeune's brilliant leadership won for him the DSM and the French Legion of Honor. The inevitable statistical comparisons—most casualties suffered, most prisoners captured, most artillery captured—all revealed the star and Indian head at the top of the list of American divisions.

A period of occupation duty followed before General Lejeune was to take the division home. His relinquishment of the command on August 3, 1919, ended this unique but happy association of Marine command over an essentially army organization and established a precedent of inter-service cooperation so successfully launched by his comrade-in-arms, General Harbord. USMC

J A

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DNT LINES 22 APRIL

FRONT LINES 29 APRIL

THE WORD "RESERVOIR" HAS A special meaning in the traditions of the U. S. Marine Corps. It will always call to memory a column of parka-clad Leathernecks fighting in the bitter cold of December 1950—the men of the 1st Marine Division who cut their way from the Chosin Reservoir to Hamhung through eight CCF divisions.

Yet there is another artificial lake that deserves a chapter in Marine history. It is the Hwachon Reservoir, a mountain-locked body of water lying just north of the 38th Parallel along the rocky spinal column of Korea. For it was in this area that the 1st Mar Div had some of its hardest and least known actions—fights worthy of comparison with the battles of Inchon-Seoul and the Chosin Reservoir.

The time was April 1951. And the occasion was the beginning of the enemy's double-barreled Spring offensive, with Red China shooting the works for a decision in Korea.

This effort did not come as any surprise. There was not even much mystery as to when and where the initial blows would fall. The Eighth U. S. Army had been given timely and accurate reports of the enemy's build-up. But nothing is certain in war except uncertainty, and it could not have been foreseen that a secondary CCF effort would lead to a sudden breakthrough west of Hwachon Reservoir.

This easy penetration, which may have astonished the Chinese themselves, exposed the entire left flank of the 1st Mar Div by opening a gap in the adjoining sector held by a ROK division. The Leathernecks were threatened with envelopment, and it took some vigorous fighting and maneuvering to prevent the enemy from exploiting his advantage.

Captured documents made it plain that the Communist purpose was nothing less than the destruction of the Eighth Army and eviction of United Nations forces from Korea. This ambitious program was to be carried out by an army estimated at about 700,000 CCF and North Korean troops, not counting units training in Manchuria.

Major counter-offensives had been launched twice before by Red China. Late in November 1950 and again on the last night of the year, the in-

By Lynn Montross

vaders struck along a trans-peninsular front. Total advances of some 200 miles were made, yet these territorial gains could not compensate for appalling casualties. For the Eighth Army and its allied Republic of Korea divisions were still intact after withdrawing to final defense lines. Every man in the ranks realized, moreover, that ground had been sacrificed rather than personnel and equipment when the Communist pressure became too heavy.

The proof of Eighth Army fighting spirit was demonstrated shortly after the end of the second CCF effort. LtGen Matthew B. Ridgway, the new Eighth Army commander, immediately launched the first of a series of limited UN offensives. While one of these drives was in progress, another was being planned and activated on a still larger scale. Thus from 15 January to 22 April 1951 the UN forces were continually striking, and the initial reconnaissance in force by an RCT had grown into the coordinated advance of three corps.

One UN operation, coming to a finish on 4 March, was followed three days later by the jump-off of another. Both offensives, like their forerunners, were planned primarily for the purpose of inflicting damage on the enemy. Gen Ridgway constantly stressed the need for security and cautioned his corps commanders to observe his three basic tenets: "coordination, maximum punishment, and maintenance intact of major units."

Another primary purpose was to keep the enemy off balance and disrupt his obvious build-up for a new counter-offensive. And though the gaining of ground was considered secondary, plans for the March offensive envisioned a northward advance to a strong UN line which could be used either for offense or defense.

"Good footwork . . . combined with firepower"—this was Gen Ridgway's formula for victory over a numerically superior enemy. It paid off so well that most of the objectives were secured by the end of March. Seoul had been reoccupied without a fight by UN forces nearing the 38th Parallel after gains of about 50 kilometers.

Only in one respect had the results been unsatisfactory—the damage inflicted on the enemy, heavy as it was, fell below expectations. That was because the Chinese had conserved their forces by delaying tactics suited to the mountainous terrain. Small units put up a temporary defense to screen withdrawals in the rear, then pulled back to prepared positions.

On 29 March, therefore, Gen Ridgway published a plan for continuing the momentum of the drive and adding to its accomplishments. The assault troops jumped off again on 2 April, and the Eighth Army ground on methodically to new objectives as the enemy continued to retreat.

The Communist forces might have been compared to an antagonist backtracking to get set for taking aim with the shotgun. There could be no question about both barrels being loaded, for CCF offensive movements were reported daily on a basis of air sightings. Undoubtedly the enemy would pull the trigger at his first opportunity, but meanwhile the footwork and firepower of the Eighth Army continued to keep him off balance.

Chunchon was abandoned, just as Hongchun had been, by Communists who kept up their delaying tactics while retreating north of the 38th Parallel. This was the situation when LtGen James A. Van Fleet assumed command of the Eighth Army on 14 April, after Gen Ridgway was named the new supreme commander

This article was prepared a year ago by the Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, in cooperation with the GAZETTE. It was originally intended for presentation in the series of consecutive official preliminary narratives dealing with Marine operations in Korea. The events treated in the article were then so recent, however, that difficulties arose in obtaining clearance for publication.

In the interests of military security, the GAZETTE and the Historical Branch postponed publication until *Red China on the Offensive* could be fully cleared. Care has been taken to delete references to Eighth Army positions, phase lines, units or statistics. These omissions, fortunately, do not detract from the story, as told by records and reports, of the part played by the 1st Marine Division in blocking the two CCF offensives in the Spring of 1951.

to succeed General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.

Gen Van Fleet, formerly head of the American Military Mission in Greece, visited one CP after another while pressing the UN advance. Although the Communists continued to retreat, reports indicated that 12 corps, numbering three divisions each, were poised behind the front for a counter-stroke. Movements of troops and supply vehicles were screened by the smoke of burning brush, but the enemy appeared to be preparing for a major attack in the Seoul area and a secondary effort on the central front.

Not only was the CCF counter-stroke a foregone conclusion, but it could also be assumed that further UN advances would force the enemy's hand. Already the UN forces were within striking distance of the so-called "Iron Triangle"—the comparatively level Chorwon-Pyongyang-Kumhwa area where the Chinese had utilized a good network of roads to concentrate for their offensive. The enemy would soon have to stand or attack, and the Eighth Army plan was flexible enough to provide for an orderly withdrawal to lines suited to an aggressive defense. This concept was in line with the Eighth Army policy of placing less value on positions than men and equipment, but the attack was to continue vigorously toward the approaches to the Iron Triangle.

On 21 April, after a brief build-up, the assault units of I and IX Corps renewed an advance calculated to goad the enemy into action.



Across the Pukhan to goad the enemy

The 1st Mar Div, as part of IX Corps, had as its objective the Hwachon Dam on the southeastern approaches to the Iron Triangle.

The enemy had recently held this area, and it seemed likely that another stubborn defense would be made. On the first day, however, the Leathernecks met almost no opposition, and by the afternoon of the 22d they reached their objectives. The enemy had put up a fight at the Hwachon Dam, but the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment took the position after forcing a crossing of the Pukhan River in DUKWs and rubber boats.

This unit, composed of Koreans trained by U. S. Marines, had distinguished itself as a fourth RCT of the 1st Mar Div during the past month. Thus on the evening of 22 April the lineup consisted from left to right of RCT-7, RCT-5 and the 1st KMC Regt, with RCT-1 in reserve. A ROK division held the sector to the west, and to the east was an infantry division of X Corps.

The first few hours of darkness passed quietly. Resistance had been light everywhere on the Eighth Army front, and officers in the various CPs

Below: The 11th Marines moved forward to cover the withdrawal



Left: KMCs—the fourth RCT

were planning a next day's advance which was never to materialize. For the first CCF attacks began at 2215 on the central front and continued throughout the night. The enemy had pulled the trigger on his long expected counter-offensive.

Before midnight the 1st Mar Div was notified by corps that the Chinese had smashed through the lines of the ROK division in the sector to the west. The penetration, extending to a point about three and a half miles south of the MLR, had opened a gap of 1,000 yards between the Marines and the nearest ROK unit.

Orders for the next day's attack were cancelled as the 1st Mar Div ordered the three forward regiments to consolidate for defense and patrol to the front. RCT-1, in reserve, was directed to send a battalion to the divisional left flank with a mission of blocking CCF attempts at envelopment. The assignment fell to the reinforced 1st Bn, which moved out at 0100 with a platoon of 4.2 mortars.

These preparations came just in the nick of time. Within the next two hours the 1st Mar Div was beating off CCF attacks on both flanks.

On the left a force of undetermined numbers struck the 1st Bn of RCT-7 with mortars, small arms, and automatic weapons. The enemy pulled back at 0300, after getting the worst of a grenade duel, only to try again an hour later in estimated battalion strength. Able Co received more than its share of the assault, but counter-attacked to wipe out a Chinese infiltration and restore the lines before the enemy withdrew at day-break.

On the divisional right flank, just west of the Hwachon Dam, the KMC Regt repulsed a succession of assaults which lasted into the daylight hours. Both regimental flanks were threatened, and on the left the enemy nearly surrounded a company of the 1st Bn. Only a platoon remained on position at 0400 when a counter-attack regained the lost ground.

RCT-5 had its turn after the Chinese infiltrated along a ridgeline in the darkness to occupy Hill 313, dominating the town of Hwachon. The enemy was holding the crest when elements of 1/5 attacked against small arms and automatic fire. An air strike was called in support, but meanwhile the infantry

stormed up the slope to drive off an estimated 150 to 200 CCF troops.

On the morning of the 23d the 1st Mar Div still held firm after defeating all enemy attempts at envelopment. But this was only the first round, and renewed CCF attacks could be expected on the wide-open left flank. In anticipation of this danger, Corps ordered the 1st Mar Div to fall back. This maneuver might be compared to closing a gate in the face of the enemy. Pivoting on the right flank while swinging southward along the exposed left flank, the division pulled back to a new diagonal line about six miles to the rear at its maximum depth.


RCT-5 and the KMC Regt fell back without enemy interference. A more difficult task awaited RCT-7, and the 2d Bn covered the withdrawal of the 1st while helicopters evacuated the wounded. This regiment assumed control of the 1st Bn of RCT-1, and the other two battalions were brought up from reserve by division orders to dig in along a ridgeline about two miles south on the divisional left flank. Thus the positions were not tied-in, and it was a reasonable conjecture that this line could afford only a temporary defense.

The readjustment of positions was completed by nightfall, when the three regiments awaited the attack. It was not long in coming, for Corps had not yet been able to bring up enough reserves to close the dangerous gap to the west. Soon after darkness the enemy struck from two directions, making a secondary effort in the north while attempting to turn the Marine left flank.

Veterans of Inchon-Seoul and the Chosin Reservoir could remember few occasions when Marines had a tougher fight. For the entire division was involved all night and most of the following day, with the 11th Marines and other supporting arms backing up the four infantry regiments.

Just as the blow of a whip is most vicious where the lash curls around its target, the CCF attack was hardest on the left flank of the 1st Mar Div. On the opposite flank, the KMC Regt and RCT-5 were least heavily engaged, though under attack or fire the whole night. RCT-7, farther to the west, had a rougher





time of it. But it was RCT-1 on the extreme left which caught the full fury of the CCF effort. Here the tactical lash cut deeply into Marine positions, and the two isolated battalions had an all-night battle to hold their ground.

The Chinese made some use of mortar and artillery fire. But for the most part they relied on small arms and automatic weapons while infiltrating through the darkness to a point near enough for throwing grenades. And having recently retreated from this area, the officers had an intimate knowledge of ridges and draws leading into Marine territory.

The Leathernecks had to maneuver as well as fight. Shortly after midnight, Corps notified Division that withdrawals to a new defensive line would be necessary. Thus after beating off CCF attacks all night,

the 1st Mar Div was up against the problem of pulling back under fire in broad daylight.

Typical of the critical actions on the hard-pressed Marine left flank was the effort made by the enemy in estimated regimental strength to cut off the 3d Bn of RCT-1, dug in along a ridge. The Chinese kept up their assaults all night, despite heavy losses, without effecting a penetration. At 0930 on the 24th the battalion was still holding its ground, though nearly out of ammunition and in danger of being surrounded.

Not only was the 3d Bn itself in peril, but the entire division was endangered. Division orders to withdraw were executed by 3/1 under heavy CCF automatic and small arms fire as the men fell back through the 2d Bn, which covered a retirement further supported by artillery and air strikes. When the 2d Bn

pulled out in its turn, the enemy managed to cut off and destroy two jeeps.

The 1st Bn, which had been hotly engaged on the left of 1/7, was released that morning from operational control of RCT-7. Under enemy pressure the three reunited battalions of RCT-1 completed their withdrawal and dug in on high ground. Again they held a line facing west, so as to repel further enemy attacks from that critical direction.

The KMC Regt and RCT-5 had no opposition when breaking off contact with the enemy and taking their positions along the new defensive line of 24 April (Map 2). This line was so much shorter that RCT-7 was withdrawn altogether and given rear area security missions.

Two Chinese probing attacks were repulsed on the night of 24-25 April by the 2d and 3d Bns of RCT-1.

Quiet prevailed elsewhere on the 1st Mar Div front except for a few mortar rounds lobbed into the positions of RCT-5.

Patrols sent out on the 25th by the 1st and 3d Bns of RCT-1 had no difficulty in making contact. The 3/1 patrol became heavily engaged only 200 yards from its own battalion positions, and the 1/1 patrol had to be extricated by tanks. In the RCT-5 sector, however, a tank-infantry patrol made no contacts in the 1/5 sector, and two 2/5 patrols ranged as far out as 1,500 yards without finding any enemy.


These tests having confirmed that the left flank was still the most vulnerable spot, added security was gained by attaching 3/7 to the left


of 2/1, thus extending the defensive positions still farther southward. Here the Marine line was bent to resemble a fishhook with its shank to the north and the barb curving around to the west and south. This analogy may also have occurred to the enemy, for there were only cautious nibbles on the night of 24-25 April in the form of two light probing attacks. The fires of the 11th Marines were required, however, to break up attempted CCF concentrations in front of the positions held by RCT-1.

There was still some pressure on the left flank during the night of 25-26 April, but the 11th Marines continued to prevent the enemy from mounting a large-scale attack. On

the other side of the gap left by the CCF breakthrough, a U. S. infantry division also extended its vulnerable flank to the southward. These defensive measures enabled IX Corps to send up reserves, and on the 26th, Gen Van Fleet published an order on a change in strategy.

Ever since January the Eighth Army had been "rolling with the punches" to contain enemy counter-strokes—giving up ground while inflicting all possible damage. But this time the commanding general decided to break off contact and fall back as much as 20 miles in some sectors to a new defensive line. And though Seoul had not previously been considered of primary importance, Gen Van Fleet directed that





The long walk back to new positions

it was to be defended and held.

All along the Eighth Army front the rearward movement began on the 25th. The 1st Mar Div was to withdraw in two stages—first, to positions covering Chunchon until service units could retire from that town; and, later, to the new defensive line. This meant that RCT-1 (with 3/7 attached) and RCT-5 were to be pulled back across the Pukhan River, while the KMC Regt on the right needed only to retire in zone.

The movement began at 1130 on 26 April without CCF interference. By 1900 all units except 2/1 and 3/7 were across the bridge, and the span was destroyed. These battalions forded the waist-deep stream in the darkness, crossing at 0230 and moving toward their new positions covering Chunchon.

It has always been a proud Marine tradition that a helpless comrade must not be neglected, and that night the men of 2/1 lent a supporting hand to a dim figure stumbling along in the darkness. It was necessary to hold him up while fording

the river, and even to boost him occasionally while climbing hills. The poor fellow was apparently too exhausted to speak, and not until daybreak did the Leathernecks discover that they had been succoring a frightened Chinese straggler who infiltrated into their lines to give himself up. He was the single prisoner taken by the division that day.

By the morning of the 27th the first phase of the withdrawal had been completed. The second phase began the next day, but owing to a shortage of vehicles it was not until the morning of the 30th that the last unit of the 1st Mar Div took its assigned position on the new defensive line.

During the Marine operations of the past week, the entire UN front



had of course been struck by the CCF counter-offensive. The forward movement of the Eighth Army was stopped in its tracks on the night of the 22d, and some of the units did not weather the attacks of the next few days without losses both of territory and personnel.

The most dramatic of these reverses took place on the west central front. Both the British 29th Brigade and the Belgian battalion came under terrific pressure from Chinese forces attempting to cut off and surround UN units. The enemy found his opportunity when a battalion of the British 29th Brigade was left isolated in the confusion of a general withdrawal, ordered by Gen Van Fleet on 23 April, to prepared lines of defense. Cut off and surrounded,

played about 36 of them between Hwachon and the west coast and some 12 to 14 from Hwachon to the east coast. Reports had not erred, as events were to prove, in predicting that the chief CCF blow would be aimed at the Yangchon-Uijongbu-Seoul corridor in the west, with a diversionary effort being made in the east-central front. At first, it is true, the sudden success of the sideshow gave it the illusion of more importance than the main act. But the enemy profited little from his breakthrough, and by the 26th the east-central front was stabilized.

It was on this date that the main enemy effort revealed itself as an attempt to smash through and capture Seoul. CCF divisions closed in from two directions on Uijongbu, com-

by the end of the month it was apparent that the Communists would not celebrate May Day in Seoul.

Four days earlier the Chinese had shot their bolt on the east-central front, and a diversionary attack in ROK sectors to the east had resulted only in the capture of Inje. Thus the first phase of the CCF counter-offensive had failed to accomplish any of its announced aims, though UN estimates placed the enemy casualties as high as 70,000 during the seven days.

But this was only the first act. The Chinese were believed to have committed about half of their immediately available strength. Eighth Army staff officers concluded, therefore, that the lull at the end of April was temporary and would be followed by a renewal of the offensive. The enemy, in short, had fired only one barrel.

Seventeen CCF divisions were believed to be available for a second performance, and Gen Van Fleet called a conference of corps commanders at his CP on 30 April. Staff officers announced that the Eighth Army was planning to take a calculated risk by reorganizing tactical elements in preparation for the next enemy attempt.

After this reshuffling, the Eighth Army was to hold on its defensive line until the time came for striking again. Each corps would have its definite missions, and Gen Van Fleet enjoined them to "keep units intact. Small units must be kept within supporting distance."

It was the commanding general's intention to conduct an active and dynamic defense. He reiterated that he wanted more mines and tactical wire, covered by fire. "We must expend steel and fire," he declared, "not men. I want to stop the enemy here and hurt him." But he also directed that aggressive patrolling be conducted by tank-infantry teams for the purpose of unmasking the enemy's preparations.

On 1 May, after the reshuffling of units, the 1st Mar Div found itself back again in X Corps under LtGen Edward S. Almond. The transition had been simple. A left-flank battalion was relieved by a U. S. infantry division, so that this division could be placed in line on the Marine left and the corps boundary shifted westward. On the Marine right was another U. S. division.



Eastfoto

The enemy celebrated his initial success

the 1st Bn of the Gloucesters fought on for 70 hours until supplies of food and water reached the vanishing point. When radios went dead and ammunition ran out, LtCol F. J. Carne, British Army, directed his survivors to scatter in small groups and try to make their way back to the UN lines. Only about 40 men succeeded after battling their way northward through enemy forces, then circling around to the south until they encountered a friendly armored column.

With an estimated 70 divisions south of the Yalu, the enemy de-

pulling elements of a U. S. infantry division to pull back to prepared positions about four miles north of the ROK capital.

The Chinese, it was believed, had set themselves the goal of sacking the city on May Day, the world-wide Communist holiday. In this aspiration they were destined to be disappointed. The enemy tried to work around the left flank by crossing the Han to the Kimpo Peninsula, but air strikes and potential naval gunfire quickly frustrated this maneuver. Another flanking attempt 35 miles to the southeast met repulse, and

The 1st Mar Div, as well as other Eighth Army units, soon began the preparation of defenses in depth—defenses bristling with mines, barbed wire entanglements, and meticulously plotted fields of fire. On 6 May, in response to corps orders, the Marines helped to patrol along the right boundary in conjunction with elements of the adjacent U. S. infantry division. RCT-7 was moved forward several miles for this purpose, and the 1st Bn of RCT-1 brought up from reserve to cover the resulting gap with patrols.

Patrolling went on vigorously along the entire 1st Mar Div front during the next ten days. Several of the larger tank-infantry teams penetrated as far as the Pukhan River, and Chunchon was entered without opposition. These actions confirmed the existence of a wide "no-man's-land," held by neither side in force, and the Leathernecks had only a few minor clashes with enemy groups.

The same situation prevailed over the entire Eighth Army front. Units from all three corps ranged forward as much as 15 kilometers with only negligible contacts.

Gen Van Fleet did not content himself with probing. For the purpose of coming to grips with the enemy as well as securing a supply route, he planned a limited offensive of the ROK Army to begin on 7 May. Navy forces on the east coast laid down a preliminary bombardment and simulated an amphibious assault on Kansong while the Fifth Air Force conducted strategic bombing missions. In conjunction with these attacks in the east, the 1st ROK Div of I Corps was directed to conduct a two-day reconnaissance in force along the west coast.

Both small-scale offensives exploded in the face of an enemy preparing for a renewal of his own offensive. The 1st ROK Div completed its mission on 9 May without discovering evidences of an enemy build-up. In the ROK sector, slow progress was made against delaying tactics; but coastal units went forward under cover of naval gunfire to capture Kansong on 9 May.

This was the day when Gen Van Fleet published his plan for a much more comprehensive drive. His purpose was to break up enemy preparations by threatening lines of communication and supply, and all three

U. S. corps were to push toward objectives just south of the 38th Parallel. Within the next few days, however, preparations for this operation were postponed because the massing of CCF troops indicated the possibility of an enemy offensive in the east instead of west. Further reports made it seem likely that this offensive might materialize within 72 hours, and the commanding general decided to stand along the defensive line.

It is never safe to under-rate an enemy, but Eighth Army staff officers apparently gave Chinese generals too much credit when they anticipated a bid for a decision in the west. True it was that the chances for a surprise or temporary success were perhaps better in the east, but the rugged and almost roadless terrain made it difficult to exploit a victory. This entire littoral, moreover, was dominated by UN sea power.

In spite of these handicaps, the enemy struck on the 16th to the east of the 1st Mar Div. Several CCF diversionary attacks were begun simultaneously in Eighth Army sectors to the west.

THE MAIN BLOW was launched by an estimated 125,000 CCF troops in the Naepyeong-Inje-Nodong area. Six divisions attacked on a 20-mile front in the vicinity of Hangey to break through the lines of two ROK divisions. Pouring into this gap, the Communists made a maximum penetration of about 30 miles which exposed the right flank of the U. S. infantry division on the west.

Gen Van Fleet acted promptly to plug the gap. Immediately after the breakthrough, he sent another U. S. infantry division, then in reserve southwest of Seoul, on a 70-mile, all-night ride to the threatened area. The hard-pressed defenders were further aided by the 1st Mar Div, which had been on the receiving end of some of the first Communist attacks.

At 0300 on 17 May, the Chinese attempted to wipe out the perimeter and roadblock which had recently been set up by the reinforced 3d Bn of RCT-7. The enemy attacked in wave after wave with a wide variety of weapons—mortars, recoilless rifles, satchel charges, grenades, small arms, and automatic weapons.

These attacks were made with suicidal desperation. Chinese soldiers, two of them wearing U. S.

Marine uniforms, were killed after climbing onto the tanks of Dog Co, 1st Tank Bn, and shouting, "Tank, let me in!" One Marine tank was disabled by a hand grenade thrown into the engine compartment, and another damaged by a satchel charge. The enemy tried to disable a third tank by rolling up a drum of gasoline and igniting it, but the Marine crew pulled away.

The reinforced Marine battalion beat off the assaults of Chinese in estimated regimental strength, but it was a hard struggle resulting in grenade duels and hand-to-hand fighting. At 0630 the enemy attempted to withdraw, but the howitzers of the 11th Marines and the planes of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had their turn. Enemy casualties were estimated at 350 killed (112 counted), 550 wounded, and 82 prisoners. The captured CCF weapons included recoilless rifles, mortars, and Russian machine guns.

On the 18th the 1st Mar Div, carrying out X Corps orders, began a maneuver designed to aid the U. S. division on the east by narrowing its front. RCT-7 was pulled back to relieve RCT-1, which side-slipped to the east to take over an area held by elements of the adjacent division. RCT-5 then swung around from the divisional left flank to the extreme right. These shifts enabled the other division to face east and repulse attacks on its flanks.

This was the climax. From 19 May onward it grew more apparent every hour that the second CCF counter-offensive had failed even more conclusively than the first. The enemy had only a narrow penetration on a secondary front to show for frightful casualties, and after four days his main attack had lost most of its momentum.

Worse yet, from the Chinese viewpoint, was the fact that the UN forces were in position to strike a return blow before the attackers recovered their tactical balance. The Eighth Army had emerged with comparatively light losses after taking every punch the attackers could throw, and now it was about to swing from the heels. Armored patrols sent out on the 20th and 21st found the Communists vulnerable in some areas, and next day the Eighth Army began a counter-attack which turned into a pursuit in some sectors of the front.

USMC

TACTICAL RADIO *family style*



**Our new radios give the voice
of command an added range of control**

✿ THERE IS A LOT OF GOOD NEWS about radio communications in the Marine Corps these days which is worth some extensive publicity. We are introducing a whole new complex of radio facilities in the divisions and the result will be a greatly increased tactical radio capability for all units from the rifle platoon on up to division headquarters.

The benefit from the adoption of the new sets will fall at exactly the echelons which are most in need and deserving of it—the rifle unit commanders and the tankers and artillerymen who support them at the battalion and company level.

For instance, the new sets will put individual tanks in direct contact with rifle platoon leaders instead of, as with the old equipment, requiring the platoon leader to talk to his company commander who would relay messages to the supporting tanks. The artillery forward observer will only have to spin his dial to converse with most infantry or tank units in his area. An infantry bat-

By Capt R. H. Kern






CHART 1

talion commander, by carrying with him a small, hand-pack set, can move as far as a mile away from his radio jeep and still have all the facilities of that vehicle.

There will be enough frequencies provided to partially relieve the shortage of frequencies for infantry units. This means the 81mm mortars of the infantry battalion are now able to have their own fire direction net. It also gives greater selection of frequencies when they conflict with adjacent units or when jamming or atmospheric make one channel unsatisfactory.

One major cause of radio failure which won't be overcome by the adoption of the new series is that they are still subject to damage by abuse or unavoidable rough handling. The radio which falls from a moving vehicle or which shares a muddy foxhole with a platoon leader for any length of time still won't operate.

The change-over to the new equipment is now well underway. The first sets came into the system about a year ago and the balance is scheduled for delivery by the end of 1953. Already in the hands of the infantry are the AN/PRC-6, which replaces the SCR-536, and the AN/PRC-10 for the SCR-300. Other sets which are due to be replaced include the SCR-619, SCR-510, SCR-608, and their vehicular equivalents, the AN/MRC-5 and 7.

Probably the best feature of the new sets, their capacity for inter-communication among various types, results from the fact that the whole series was engineered as a tactical




CHART 2

family; whereas most of the present equipment was developed independently to meet a specific requirement of an infantry or artillery or tank unit.

To illustrate this independent development, the SCR-536 was built solely to provide a means of communication within a rifle company and as a result it cannot be logically netted with any other military radio. Similarly, the SCR-300, because of its specialized development, operates in a band between 40 and 48 megacycles where no other radio even approached. The new sets are designed to enable all echelons of infantry to be in contact and, further, to provide a considerable amount of inter-communication among infantry, artillery, and tank units. This inter-communication capability was partially apparent in some of the old sets. It is accomplished by making a part of the spectrum covered

by one type common to another type, and is represented in the old equipments by the SCR-608 and SCR-508 which occupy ten common channels.

In developing the new equipment, the engineers divided the available frequencies into three parts—one part for armor, one for artillery, and one for infantry. Since the three arms have varying radio requirements the division of the spectrum was made in such a way as to provide 80 channels for armor, 120 channels for artillery, and 170 channels for infantry. By overlapping the frequencies in each band it was possible to create inter-communication between arms. This overlap can best be illustrated by a chart on which a line representing the frequency spectrum from 20 to 60 megacycles is divided according to the assignment to each arm. The slight overlapping of each arm represents ten channels. (Chart 1). There-

fore armored units can communicate with artillery over ten of their 80 channels and artillery elements can communicate with infantry over ten of their 120 channels. It is important to state here that these new equipments permit complete frequency selection over any part of their range merely by turning the main tuning dial. A brief examination of the chart will show that, so far, there is no provision for communication between armor and infantry since their frequencies are separated by the artillery spectrum. Although this disadvantage is partially overcome by a means which will be described later, it still must be called a relatively weak point in the system.

In addition to definitely assigning frequency bands to each of the three arms, the engineers who developed these new sets also created some good selling points for the equipment by the manner in which the sets are designed. Starting with the premise that, whether infantry, artillery, or armor, the services needed two different shapes and sizes of radio—one small size for man-pack requirements and one of a larger size and greater power for vehicular use—they proceeded to design all the portable sets for the three services in exactly the

same physical proportions and they accomplished the same purpose with the larger vehicular sets. Consequently, the portable set for armor looks exactly like the same set for artillery or for infantry. The only difference, naturally, is in their frequency ranges and this is a question of internal design. Similarly, for the vehicular set, the only clues as to the arm for which it is intended are the nameplate and the scale which shows the frequency band.

The advantages of this plan are immediately apparent when one notes the large number of spare parts that are interchangeable among this new equipment. Considering this advantage in terms of the old type sets we see that the portable radio for armor, the SCR-510, is a square, bulky, box-on-box arrangement with an incongruous looking antenna protruding from the side or top, while the portable radio for infantry, the SCR-300, more sleekly built, is generally rectangular in shape, slightly smaller at the top than at the bottom but too big all over. The only thing interchangeable between an SCR-510 and SCR-300 is the paint with which they are both covered. In case this comparison needs to be carried further,

the portable set for the artillery, the SCR-619, looks like neither of the others and is heavier than both.

The nomenclature for the new sets, while still not as simple as "radio comma portable comma infantry," nevertheless represents a great stride forward from the hieroglyphics of the good old days. The joint Army-Navy (AN) nomenclature is used to identify the new equipment. The portable sets in each arm are all called AN/PRC, which means "AN" system Portable Radio Communication. The sets have a number suffixed to this designation to identify the equipment and which, in this case, indirectly indicates their frequency range since this is their major difference. The portable set for armor is the AN/PRC-8, for artillery it is the AN/PRC-9, and for infantry it is the AN/PRC-10. The vehicular sets all have the designation AN/GRC, or "AN" system Ground Radio Communication and the numbers 3, 5, or 7 are added to identify the sets which are used by armor, artillery, or infantry respectively.

This is the best time to mention the one new set which does not fit categorically with the others. Because the infantry has a requirement

Old models were not as sleek or sturdy as the new versions






Diagram shows capabilities of new family of radios at work for an infantry battalion. Distances are to scale, but no attempt has been made to position units tactically.

KEY




AN/PRC—6



AN/PRC—8, 9, or 10



AN/GRC—3, 5, or 7



for an especially small, not necessarily powerful, hand-pack set for communication within the rifle company the designers produced the AN/PRC-6, which is about the size and conformation of a large Spam can which has been kicked and slightly bent in the middle. This set is non-conformist in that there are no similarly shaped sets in artillery or armor but, in respect to frequency, it covers part of the same band as the regular infantry AN/

PRC-10. Actually the AN/PRC-6 has a slightly different frequency range than does the AN/PRC-10. Specifically it has five more channels at the upper end of its spectrum. Because of its small size and accompanying engineering limitations it must be pre-set on any one of its channels by a technician and has no facility for easy dialing through its entire range. Its frequency can only be changed by a technician.

The next advantage of the new

equipment to be discussed is quite obscure and, superficially, seems to be of no great value. Actually it is a vital key to greatly increased flexibility and provides the partial solution to the problem of how to communicate between armor and infantry. The basis of the advantage lies in the fact that the vehicular AN/GRC-3, 5, and 7, in addition to the capabilities which have already been discussed, have a built-in, low-powered second transmitter and receiver set which operates through a large part of the infantry range including all AN/PRC-6 frequencies, and has a reliable range of one mile. It is now apparent that the various vehicular sets, although primarily capable of communication in the armor, artillery, or infantry ranges, can also be tuned in a great part of the infantry spectrum where, among portable sets, only the AN/PRC-6 and 10 can reach. Thus we see that the vehicular radios are actually two complete sets and their capabilities can easily be illustrated by reference to a chart (Chart 2). Note that all the vehicular sets, plus the AN/PRC-6 and 10, are inter-communicable through a major part of the infantry spectrum.

WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF this common capability of several sets? Does it provide a real tactical contribution or is it merely a fancy gadget? Just the fact that it enables all the new vehicular sets to communicate among themselves is reason enough to consider it a real advantage, especially since this communication can be carried on simultaneously with the regular armor, artillery, or infantry transmissions of the equipment without interfering. In addition, it enables any vehicular radio set of any arm to communicate with infantry platoons provided the distance is not more than one mile. The tactical implications of this feature are extensive and can only be fully realized after a period of trial and experimentation in FMF units. It is possible that we have become so used to the restrictions of present equipments that we accept them to the point where it will be at first difficult to take advantage of the new benefits.

As has been indicated, the portable sets of the various arms do not have the built-in second set in the

common band. Should such communication be desired it is still possible to accomplish it by a retransmission feature of the new sets which easily enables an incoming signal to be picked up on a vehicular radio and rebroadcast on still another frequency. These possibilities indicate that, in our first efforts to gain the best methods, we will as often be providing too much communications as too little. After all, there seems to be little advantage in enabling the regimental special services officer to exchange pleasantries with the assistant platoon leader of the 2d Battalion's 81mm mortar platoon.

The weights of the new radios, an important feature in portable equipment, represent an across-the-board advantage over the radios previously in use. The operating weights of the SCR-510, 619, and 300 are approximately 40, 55, and 35 pounds respectively, while the new AN/PRC-8, 9, and 10 are just about 20 pounds apiece. The physical dimensions of the new sets are also much more acceptable than were the old, as the photos on page 25 of this article clearly show.

The nomenclature which has been used in this article for all the portable sets represents the actual names by which the radios will be described in field use. In the case of vehicular sets it is intended that they can be used as a separate piece of equipment or else permanently installed in a vehicle. There are many technical factors which determine whether a radio is integral to or separate from the vehicle which carries it, and there is no advantage to be gained here in going into these details. It is important to know, however, that if the radio maintains its separate status its nomenclature will remain as has been described in this article. For instance, an AN/GRC-3 which is mounted in a tank is said to maintain its separate status mainly because the tank has a primary mission other than the transportation of the radio. Therefore the radio in the tank is still called an AN/GRC-3. If the same radio were removed from the tank and mounted in one of the jeeps of the tank battalion it would receive a different name because the primary purpose of the jeep would be to transport the radio. The jeep and the radio would thus become one piece of equipment called

an AN/MRC-36, which, translated, means "AN" system Mobile Radio Communication set number 36.

It then follows that the jeep radios for the armor, artillery, and infantry will be called AN/MRC-36, 37, and 38, respectively.

The new sets which have been mentioned in this article do not represent the entire membership of this new family of tactical radios. The research and development was done primarily by the Army Signal Corps engineers and the radios are the culmination of approximately a seven-year project. The Army plans to use a considerably greater number of the new sets than does the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has, through selective purchasing, obtained what it believes to be the basic sets for an integrated tactical radio network for an infantry division. This partially explains some of the apparent inconsistencies in nomenclature. For example, it explains why we have the AN/GRC-3, 5, and 7, but do not have the AN/GRC-4, 6, or 8. The Army's additional requirement stems from a slightly different concept of tactical communications within their infantry division and their need for additional facilities in armored divisions not found in the Marine Corps.

On one final point of comparison between the old and the new radios, their relative power output and transmission ranges, there is no clear cut advantage to be gained in the changeover. Transmission ranges depend on the size of the radio, the frequency in which it operates, and the purpose for which the radio is intended. In terms of reliable communications the AN/PRC-6 is considered a one-mile set. The portable AN/PRC-8, 9, and 10 are rated at about five miles, and the vehicular sets AN/GRC-3, 5, and 7 are said to be reliable at ten miles.

All the new equipments have design and engineering advances built in which make them less subject to failure. This will mean that the word "reliable" will become a more valid term in connection with the new sets than it was with the old.

Their employment, like any other weapon, reaches a certain effectiveness through the built-in capabilities of the equipment and, for greater effectiveness, depends on the foresight and skill with which they are used in the field.

US MC

in brief



The latest in sniper techniques is demonstrated (above) in Korea by SSgt Leo A. Masud.

The Army recently announced that it is considering reorganization of the over-all structure of its infantry regiments to increase firepower, improve tactical control, and utilize manpower more effectively.

A sword owned by the late Maj-Gen Smedley D. Butler was presented (below) to Marine Corps Commandant Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. by Mrs. Butler and Smedley D., Jr. Following the presentation, troops of Marine Barracks, HQMC marched in a special sunset parade. The sword originally had been given to Gen Butler by citizens of his native West Chester, Pa. when he returned from China in 1901.



The new Chief of Naval Operations, Adm Robert B. Carney (left), is briefed by his predecessor, Adm W. M. Fechteler.

Redesigning of the standard utility uniforms has been announced by HQMC. Limited issue will begin in the fall. The shirt, patterned after the civilian-type sport shirt, has a convertible collar, long sleeves, button-type cuffs, fly front, two breast pockets with pointed flaps, and a large map pocket under the left breast pocket. Utility trousers have been designed similar to current cotton khaki trousers. Another feature will be replacement of old-styled metal buttons by flat bone ones. The new caps are expected to retain their shape after laundering and will be made available in five sizes instead of the current three.

The 1st Mar Div became the most frequently cited unit in the United States Armed Forces when Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps announced award of a fifth Presidential Unit Citation to the division. The latest award was made for the division's performance in breaking out of a Chinese trap during the Chosin Reservoir operation from 27 November to 11 December 1950. The list of reinforcing units entitled to the award was not ready at press time.



Mighty Mite, already proven ready for land warfare and helicopter drops, became water-borne in recent tests at Quantico. Addition of special flotation gear made the utility vehicle capable of moving over unfordable streams and navigating inland waterways. The flotation kit, consisting of four light-weight rubber tubes and a frame which is at-


President Eisenhower recently ordered establishment of a National Defense Service Medal for award to persons for service in the Armed Forces of the United States between 27 June 1950 and a terminal date to be fixed by the Secretary of Defense. The Secretaries of the Navy, Army, Air Force, and Treasury will establish issuance regulations.



tached to the body of the vehicle, can be carried in the Mighty Mite. Tubes are inflated from the exhaust and are held to the frame by six "jacks." They stay in low position while the vehicle is in water but may be raised to clear obstacles when Mighty Mite is travelling on the ground. The vehicle's own wheels take care of propulsion and steering while in the water.

Newest medium tank in the U.S. defense arsenal, the Patton 48, is ready for issue to Army units.

Refueling in flight is accomplished by an Air Force Boeing KB-29. The plane is using the Probe and Drogue system in refueling the three British Gloster Meteor jets.



Skipper with Two Hats



By 1stLt H. D. Fredericks

FEW JUNIOR OFFICERS REALIZE the problems associated with the command of the H&S company of an infantry battalion in combat. Those who have been tapped for the job at one time or another are now grimly aware of the position's pitfalls, but for the others who still believe the headquarters commandant has a soft touch, this article may provide the rude awakening.

Take a look at H&S company—a heterogeneous group of individuals—clerks, supply and motor transport personnel, communicators, cooks and corporals, all concerned with

their specialties and all of them mentally viewing H&S company as nothing more than a convenient mailing address.

The company commander is considered in another light. He is the man who constantly interferes with the operation of the various sections by laying down the law on installation locations and by constant harping on the type of defense needed.

Actually, in addition to leading a company of men with such varying specialties, the H&S company commander has a dual responsibility since he also acts as the headquarters

commandant. The nature of his job and the scope of his responsibilities pose distinct problems. Let us approach the situation by enumerating them and then discussing each problem in its turn.

(1) The seeming lack of personnel to perform the various duties imposed upon the company.

(2) Lack of the necessary key personnel in company headquarters to assist the company commander in his various duties.

(3) The danger of friction between the company commander and the various staff officers.

**The unenlightened call the billet a soft touch, but
to the CO of an H&S company, it's a headache under both caps**

The selection of the battalion command post and the subsequent displacement of the command post will not be covered in this article. The subject is too complex to be included.

Now let's turn to the first problem—the seeming lack of personnel to perform the various duties of H&S Co. Well, what are the duties of H&S Co in the field? There are many as the company performs its function of supporting the combat units of the battalion. It supplies the battalion with food, both hot and cold. Hot chow is furnished by the mess section and the cold chow, "C" rations, assault rations, etc., is furnished by the supply section which also has the job of keeping the battalion supplied with ammunition, water, clothing, gasoline, spare parts, paper, pencils, and the thousand other necessary items of supply.

THE COMMUNICATIONS PLATOON keeps the battalion in touch with subordinate units and higher echelons. The S-1 section performs the paper work, S-2 provides the latest intelligence information, and the S-3 section drafts the plans and orders and supervises the tactical operations. Motor transport operates and maintains the vehicles and the medical platoon provides medical attention for the battalion. Although all these functions fall within the scope of H&S Co, they are not the responsibility of the H&S company commander, but rather those of the various section leaders. The duties that fall upon the company commander are those which the company must perform as a unit.

For example, one of the most important responsibilities of H&S Co as a unit is that of internal security. Actually there isn't too much of a problem here. It's just a matter of informing the various sections of the number of men they must keep on watch each night.

However, many times the battalion defense line is stretched to the

breaking point. It may be that one of the companies is on detached duty or that the battalion has been assigned a particularly wide frontage. In such instances, H&S Co is often ordered to man a sector of the battalion perimeter, and here is where the company commander must scrape the bottom of the barrel for men to put on the line. Inevitably the situation runs something like this:

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE to take men from the medical platoon. It has assigned a good portion of the section to the line units to act as company aid men. Those left are needed to man the battalion aid station and to care for the casualties who must be evacuated. The communications platoon, although relatively large, also seems to lack personnel for company jobs, for it too has men assigned to the rifle companies acting as radio-men and wiremen. Most of the communications men who remain are needed in battalion headquarters to man the radios and to keep the message center and switchboard operating. However, it is usually possible to get about ten men from the communications officer. The majority of the supply and motor transport personnel are busy and are needed in their respective organizations. However, once it gets dark most of the supply section should be available, since it is almost impossible to distribute supplies at night under blackout conditions. This gives you about five more men.

The cooks, except those left with the galley equipment, wherever that may be, should be available to a man. As long as you are in immediate contact with the enemy there will be very little hot chow served, despite the adage of "two up, one back, and serve the troops a hot meal." This should give you about 15 more men. The staff sections combined can probably furnish you with only five men, since clerks are needed to keep the casualty report-

ing up to date, and since intelligence men are usually assigned to the rifle companies and also are needed at the battalion commander's OP. From company headquarters, the company commander releases almost every man with the exception of the first sergeant—a grand total of four men. And so, for our perimeter security we now have about 40 men, a fair-sized platoon, but seldom adequate to man the assigned sector of the perimeter.

PATROLLING is another mission often assigned H&S Co. In Korea, this usually occurred when the battalion was in a perimeter defense in a fairly safe area. Obtaining personnel in this situation was a little more difficult. All sections, especially the mess, supply, motor transport, and staff sections were working full time.

With a little cajoling and begging it was possible to obtain a man or two from motor transport or supply if things were not too busy. How-



ever, this was usually the time when the process of resupply was at its peak—when companies were trying to replace lost and damaged equipment, and when the vehicles were being utilized to the fullest, hauling supplies, transporting motorized patrols, and receiving much-needed repairs. All the cooks were needed to keep the chow line moving.

The communications platoon again could furnish a few men. Most of the communications section was busy at various jobs—on patrols the rifle companies were sending out, "trouble shooting" telephone lines, keeping the message center operative, and repairing radios and telephones. The number of communicators available for a patrol usually num-


most of the sections rotated their men. Not company headquarters, however. We were forced to send the same men out day-after-day. After the patrol was over they still had their regular work to do—not a very pleasant situation when the men knew that the average rifle squad went on patrol only every *other* day.

We did get one break, however, that aided the cause no end. A platoon of Korean police (about 18 men) was attached to our battalion and these men were used regularly in perimeter defense and on patrols.

Our second problem, the one I consider most important, was the lack of key personnel to assist the company commander. At the present time the T/O for company head-

connaissance accompanied by the communications officer to pick out the site. When the battalion moves up, usually in echelons, the company commander and the runner spot the various sections. The first sergeant has the duty of bringing up the rest of the company. Here is where the lack of key personnel shows up. After the "Top" brings the remainder of the company forward he must prepare his personnel report, therefore he is no longer available to assist in setting up the CP. Yet, there is still much to do.

Security must be posted as soon as the company arrives in the area. Command post tents must be erected and heads and garbage pits must be dug. Rear elements of the com-



bered four or five. The S-1 section needed all its men to catch up on casualty reporting and to take care of the many administrative duties of the battalion, but the S-2 section might be able to furnish a man or two. Again the H&S company commander was forced to release the majority of the company headquarters staff to provide an additional two or three men for the patrol.

Thus the number of men actually available for a patrol was 13—one from supply, one from motor transport, five from communications, one from S-2, three from company headquarters, a corpsman, and a radio operator.

Frequently it was necessary for H&S to furnish a patrol. Of course,

quarters includes a first sergeant, a property sergeant, and two or three clerks. In order to show the need for additional personnel, we must review a few of the company commander's two-hatted duties.

He is responsible for the administration of his company, and is assisted in this duty by the first sergeant and one clerk. The other clerks are assigned to the rear echelon of the battalion to care for the service record books and to handle the company correspondence. The one clerk up forward also acts as the company commander's runner.

The H&S company commander is also responsible for the planning and establishment of the new command post. He usually makes a re-

pany may not arrive until later, and upon arrival they must be conducted and assigned to their respective areas. They must be kept moving in this operation so as not to congest the command post. Vehicular traffic must be controlled and the vehicles must be spotted so that maximum dispersion is achieved.

THE CONTROL OF the vehicular traffic and the movement of any rear elements can be handled by the runner if he is well trained and carefully instructed. Initially, the company commander should stay in the immediate vicinity of the CP to supervise the work and receive and carry out any special instructions from the battalion commander. If the com-



pany commander is involved with these details, who is going to establish the local security? The property sergeant is busy issuing chow and supplies, the first sergeant is working on his personnel report, and the runner is directing traffic—there is no one left in headquarters section to supervise setting up security.

I adopted a solution which was also used by other H&S company commanders within the regiment—the assigning of a company gunnery sergeant. Upon moving into an area, he immediately established the necessary local security which was checked later by the company commander. He also, after being instructed by the company commander, began to organize whatever security the company was to establish that night. (If the company were assigned a sector of the perimeter, the Top was a responsible man to command the platoon assigned to that sector.) This system worked very well in Korea, and the movement of the company and establishment of the CP with its security and installations was accomplished smoothly.

The third situation, one which never arose while I was in Korea, nevertheless should be mentioned because it can hamper the headquarters commandant in the performance of his duties—that is the lack of cooperation by other staff officers. The headquarters commandant assigns the staff sections their positions within the CP. In so doing, he must keep in mind their needs as well as

the most efficient method of operation and security for the CP as a whole. If the staff officers have any complaints, they should make them directly to the headquarters commandant and not to any of his subordinates, since these subordinates are only carrying out instructions and do not have any authority to make any changes in the arrange-

ment of the CP. The staff officers should make a supreme effort to furnish the company commander with any personnel needed to carry out assignments. They should take all company personnel and supply problems through the company commander and not directly to the S-1 or S-4.

On the other hand, the headquarters commandant has certain obligations to the staff and must fulfill them. He must insure that they are supplied with all the necessities for successful operation in the field. He should consult the staff officers before assigning new personnel to their sections, insuring that these replacements are qualified and needed. And any disciplinary problems should be discussed thoroughly with the staff officer immediately superior to the man concerned.

In summary, I would like to stress these points—that an H&S company commander needs two things besides the normal amount of officer-like qualifications to lead his company in the accomplishment of any mission assigned to it. He needs the cooperation of all staff officers within the company and should have a company gunnery sergeant to assist him and the first sergeant in the supervision of his company. USMC



By Yoshitaka Horie,
former major,
Japanese Imperial Army



Defense Plan for Chichi Jima

THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE HEADQUARTERS announced the fall of Iwo Jima on 23 March 1945. On the same day Major General Tachibana was made commanding general of the 1st Mixed Brigade, located on Chichi Jima, and was promoted to lieutenant general. He was given the responsibility of re-organizing the 109th Division extending over the entire Bonin Islands, and appointed me as chief of staff.

Time was passing fast and, at the end of June 1945, the battle for Okinawa was coming to an end. One hundred days after the fall of Iwo Jima, our forces were composed of about 15,000 officers and men on Chichi Jima. There were no women or children left on the island—it was stripped for battle, and we were wasting away from hard work and food reduction.

In July, we became greatly concerned over the fate of Chichi Jima. We decided to make a study and called a meeting of about 700 Army and Navy officers, who would help defend the island if we were attacked. The gathering included one lieutenant general, a vice admiral, many colonels, Navy captains, and

ranks down to lieutenant. At this meeting many questions were asked.

With Iwo Jima already gone and with the decisive battle for the homeland drawing closer, deployment of 15,000 troops on Chichi Jima was not advisable. It was held that a force of this size would be more valuable in the homeland itself. However, our sea transport system was such that we could not transport troops to the mainland.

We decided the only way open to us was to live under self-sustenance and contribute to the defense of the homeland as an anti-air lookout and weather-observation post. Should the enemy invade us, we could only hope to enforce a terrific sacrifice upon him.

"The possibility is very great," said a colonel, "that the enemy will take into consideration the fact that the rugged topography of Chichi Jima would mean a high price for its invasion, and that even after it is taken its operational value would be very small. So the enemy no doubt will resort to self-perishing tactics by enforcing a tight blockade and by continuous bombing."

"On the other hand," spoke a



Navy captain, "I cannot say that the enemy will not, with the aim of using Chichi Jima as an anchorage for part of the ships to be used in the invasion of the homeland, and especially as a repair base for out-of-order vessels and as an advanced base for part of their fighter force, employ a special and new method in attempting invasion to reduce the cost in lives. We must be prepared to crush or at least meet both of these tactics."

"Although the Americans are a people that have great respect for human lives and the Red Cross Treaty," continued the captain, "we must not fail to be prepared for any emergency. The topography of this island is very uneven and complicated, enabling haze to stay set; and as a means of blinding caves and holes, smoke may be used on a grand

scale or perhaps locally."

Much talking followed. Senior Army officers thought that the enemy, using a large number of Iwo Jima-based planes, might attack repeatedly with gasoline and incendiary chemicals in an attempt to burn out all farm land, woods, positions, structures, etc. They also voiced the possibility that the enemy would resort to the use of many flame devices after landing.

Now, EVERYBODY sat back and listened with wrinkled foreheads as the senior Navy officer began to speak. "At the battle of Saipan," he said, "when we still retained a powerful naval force, the enemy having to be prepared to meet it had comparatively few purely invasion-type bombardment vessels, but as the Philippine campaign progressed into

the Iwo Jima and Okinawa campaigns, this number had steadily increased. Especially when the rugged terrain of Chichi Jima is concerned, it is reasonable to say that even greater bombarding firepower will be brought to bear against this island. More still, not only carrier planes but Iwo Jima and Marianas-based planes can be used together, thus making the fact clear that the enemy air power would be very great.

"A summary of the land, sea, and air power the enemy has employed in the main island battles from Saipan up to Okinawa shows much weight on the side of the enemy.

"The enemy, employing an overwhelming amount of sea and air power and chemical weapons, will generally carry out land operations after thoroughly destroying and gaining control. In other words, af-

'Should the enemy invade us, we could only hope to enforce a terrific sacrifice on him'





"We could not afford to shoot at evasive targets"

ter softening-up with tremendous material, the enemy will send in his infantry to take over. But, reflecting upon the characteristics of Chichi Jima's topography where the terrain is very much rugged and fortifications rather well developed, I cannot say that the enemy will not, with a part of his surface forces or by using airborne forces, attempt surprise and storming assault to catch us off guard.

"It is required at present that the homeland devote its all to the decisive battle, so we must not expect one thing from the homeland. Owing to the existing conditions, we cannot expect supply from our homeland and, therefore, what ammunition and materials we have in stocks must be used carefully and economically."

The general paid great attention to these and other observations. At last he gave his opinion: "Americans seem to think that the amount of material used can minimize the loss of life. The enemy is gradually changing his tactics by using new devices and plans. For example, in the Saipan and Morotai campaigns of last summer, enemy defenses had a wide space between each man, forming only a single line. Thus surprise attacks were easily achieved. But on the Okinawa front these aspects greatly changed. That is, the space between each man became extremely narrow and formed a complex line. In addition to this they

posted detecting and alarming devices including dogs; thus penetration of their lines became well-nigh impossible. In short, the enemy is ever changing his tactics and he will use methods to shut out our favorite tactics of night infiltration and bodily assaults against their tanks. We must not allow ourselves to be caught by such movements as the enemy has shown on the battlefield

in the past. If the enemy tries tactics to crush ours it will be necessary to out-manuever him. We must originate fresh tactics to counter the enemy's."

And so it was decided to make Chichi Jima an invulnerable permanent fortress by continuing war preparations and developing self-sustenance of the island to the utmost.

In the meantime, it was necessary to contribute to the protection of our homeland by acting as an anti-aircraft lookout and weather observation station.

We all felt that the most appropriate method of meeting an enemy attacking us with overwhelming land, sea, and air power would be by guerrilla warfare. We were going to avoid the powerful brunt of the enemy force and attack its most vulnerable points from the rear.

The plan was to avoid a flashy display of tactics as were used in the Gempei era (about 700 years ago) when each warrior appeared before his foe and fought it out. We were going to wait patiently for an opportunity, and by making the most of fortifications, geographical positions and weather conditions, kill as many of the enemy as possible.

To gain this end, self-possession and bravery in the individual fight-

"We must originate fresh tactics . . ."



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"It was important to destroy enemy weapons such as flame throwers"

ing man were needed. Severe damage had to be dealt the enemy by careful use of ammunition—there was no more available than the supply on the island. On account of the special character of the fighting planned, initiative and cool judgment were to be required from each soldier. Therefore, it was decided that tactical education must be given to each soldier by his leaders.

Due to topography the chances were that the artillery would have to shoot at more sea than land targets. Guns able to shoot at land targets would have to conserve as much ammunition as possible so as to avoid the plight of having guns but no ammunition by the time the enemy landed.

IT WAS CONSIDERED that the most painful blow to the enemy would be the loss of personnel. Therefore, we felt it would be desirable to direct our efforts to this point. We knew it was also important to destroy enemy weapons such as tanks, heavy artillery, mortars, and flame throwers.

Good fortifications were important. It was our fortifications that gave the enemy the most difficulties on Peleliu, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima. On the other hand, as in Leyte where field encounters arose without adequate time to prepare fortifications, the difficulties our forces faced were well known.

Our fortifications on Chichi Jima were better than those on Iwo Jima or Okinawa, but they were still far from perfect, even after all guns were placed in rock positions connected with passageways. In comparison with the fortifications at Port Arthur, Corregidor, and Verdun, our fortifications were still in their elementary stage. Considering the power of the enemy rockets and bombs, it was necessary that our fortifica-

tions be strengthened still further.

Certain tenets were laid down for the highly important sniping mission assigned. The situation made it necessary that our snipers follow these rules:

1. Remain hidden from enemy.
2. Take the enemy by surprise.
3. Be economical with ammunition and obtain a hit with each shot.

Economy of ammunition was essential not only to the snipers but also to other units. The fact that our ammunition supply from the homeland was cut off made it necessary to agree to operate under the following fire plan:

Light machine guns and rapid-fire weapons were to fire only one round at a time, and heavy machine guns were trained and locked on set target areas so a few shots fired sporadically would hit a designated vulnerable area. Each unit commander was given the responsibility of allotting ammunition to each gun.

Heavy arms, including infantry and rapid-firing weapons, were to carry on their fighting concealed in caves with their tactics based on the first sniping principle.

Especially stressed was the necessity for the economical use of ammunition and the tenets of waiting patiently for the proper opportunity before opening fire on the enemy. Snipers would be deployed in caves situated away from strong points, and it was deemed necessary to have them in positions on the mountain sides, valleys, and passes, with close communication and free movement to other positions.

Our enemy's tactics in the past had been to form a clear line of battle in a certain direction and, by utilizing bombing and shelling power, attempt a general breakthrough of our lines.

In the situation on Chichi Jima, as we diagnosed it, if we retreated too early or readjusted our lines to oppose theirs directly, it would enable the enemy to make good use of his tactics and especially facilitate the use of bombing and shelling. So it was essential that we plan to hold points in the enemy's rear to keep a general line and division of forces from being established. The general confusion which was sure to follow would make it difficult for the enemy to use effective bombing or shell-

ing for fear of killing his own troops.

For the reasons stated above it was necessary that we concentrate on the construction of fortifications and building of hidden sniper positions which would be certain to be in the enemy's rear when the attack came. It was also necessary to train the individual in maintaining presence of mind, use of initiative, patience in waiting for an opportunity, and the capability of laughing in the face of death, for a great number of troops would operate as isolated units.

History of battle had demonstrated that the Imperial Japanese Forces achieved great success by infiltration attacks on land and sea. The enemy had become so concerned over our infiltration tactics that he had strengthened his defensive lines. Therefore, it would be difficult to accomplish infiltration through the usual method of passing through his line.

The key to our battle plan was the placement of our troops in the enemy's rear. Thus it was that I recommended previously approved, secret positions where men would remain concealed until the enemy passed by. I further suggested that hidden tunnels be prepared beforehand, so that our soldiers could pass through the enemy's front lines. In addition, a study of the topography of Chichi Jima indicated that it would not be too difficult to infiltrate through the lines at certain points by taking advantage of natural cover.

Every unit was to prepare and practice covering fire from the positions in the enemy's rear just mentioned. These units were urged to use originality in the usage of these surprise covering fire missions so as to cause the utmost confusion in the enemy's ranks.

Considering the fact that infiltration units are expendable and may not be expected to return, and that sending out a great number of men at the same time would result in a sudden loss of that force, it was necessary to plan to send out a few men (individually, if possible) at a time. Infiltration attacks carried out in battalion and company strength, as on Luzon, would have been difficult

to apply at Chichi Jima.

In planning for sea warfare, swimming infiltration units of a few men each were inferred to be most effective. In the Luzon campaign, several infiltration swimming units, each composed of four volunteers, swam, towing barrels of explosives with them, and landed in the rear of the enemy. Some of them returned after blowing up enemy tents (accommodating 20 men) and tanks.

ON THE OTHER HAND, at Palau men on board rafts approached an enemy sub-chaser and, after abandoning their rafts, swam toward the ship with explosives in their arms and destroyed its crew.

Every unit was to train a few picked swimmers to swim at night and to study the carrying of explosives in water. At the same time, the 17th Shipping Engineering Regiment was to practice maneuvering boats at night with part of its force.

We found it necessary to make a study of the vulnerability of enemy tanks to avoid fruitless use of ammunition on that type of armor built to withstand light ordnance fire. It was necessary to take into consideration that the topography of Chichi Jima made it unfavorable for us if enemy tanks made deep penetrations. If such a situation developed it would be necessary for us to remain calm and not panic. Tank traps and positions from which individual body attacks on tanks could be launched had to be constructed well into the interior, as our plan for destruction of enemy tanks was to be carried out during a long-range program. The destruction of the enemy infantry accompanying the tanks was to be accomplished by snipers roving over the terrain as aspects of the battle demanded.

In the past the enemy was known to have used airborne attacks and there was a possibility he would use them in a surprise attack on Chichi Jima. Inasmuch as surprise is the objective of airborne assaults they are not to be feared if proper preparation is made for them. Each unit was to study the capabilities of airborne forces and was to set up its infiltration positions so that they

could be used as anti-airborne positions also.

When the enemy's landing intentions were apparent, we were to observe and be in a position to deploy quickly and wipe out the attacking force by sniper fire and bayonet attacks immediately after the landing. Our counter-attack was timed for "immediately after the landing" because parachutists descend at a speed of five meters per second, making a very difficult target while in the air. As our ammunition was limited, we could not afford to shoot at evasive targets.

Airborne forces of the enemy were usually small in number, but they were usually crack troops. If they made a successful landing we would be confronted by an attacking force within our lines which would be especially dangerous if the attack was coordinated with one from the sea. Thus it was necessary that an airborne assault should be wiped out as quickly as possible.


While the enemy had shown a great respect for the Geneva Convention tenets in the past, it was always possible he might use gases or chemicals other than the incendiaries and smokes he had been using.

In preparation for the flame throwers, etc. we knew he would use, and in addition to being prepared for any other eventuality, it was necessary to build basic structures at each strong point to seal out gas and flames. Inside each chamber were to be materials necessary for basic needs such as food, water, and cooking utensils. We needed at least a two-months supply of water on hand for the type of campaign we planned.


With all these preparations made, it was felt that each combat unit could carry out its mission, and we could inflict terrible casualties upon the enemy while keeping a large force of theirs occupied for some time, thus easing pressure on the homeland.

As it happened, however, our ideas for the defense of Chichi Jima were never tested by fire. Alas! The homeland surrendered, and our preparations came to nothing.

In making our plans for defense, we took into consideration the enemy's scheme of attack as he came across the Pacific. If his assault had come, we would have been well prepared to meet his tactics. USMC




the PILOT for the JOB



☛ TODAY, THROUGHOUT THE CORPS, EACH OFFICER AND MAN IS REQUIRED to qualify annually in his basic weapon. Aviators fire for record with the .38-caliber pistol, which is the weapon they normally carry according to the T/O.

Qualification for the aviators with the .38 is in keeping with regulations and it is all well and good, but a pilot might be required to use his pistol under combat conditions only once or twice in a lifetime. He uses his aircraft and aircraft weapons many times a month, and in combat he uses them daily. Why not have him qualify with his *real* weapons—his plane and the weapons integral to it?

Marine aviators today are required to maintain an instrument card which states they are currently qualified to fly an aircraft under instrument conditions, and that they can read a weather report. These re-



By Maj William D. Armstrong



quirements are certainly necessary, but what have we done to require aviators to qualify annually in aerial gunnery, rocketry, strafing, and bombing?

It would be well to establish a program requiring aviators to qualify in the use of their aircraft weapons, just as ground Marines do with their basic weapons. They could be rated in much the same manner—expert, sharpshooter, and marksman.

The results of their annual qualification would be made a part of their official records and a report would be forwarded to the Division of Aviation to be incorporated into their official flight records.

Such a program would insure that aviators who were expert shots with aircraft weapons would be assigned to fighter planes, and that those who were good in the bombing tests would be assigned to bombing groups. Aviators who could not qualify in either bombing or aerial gunnery would be assigned to transport or helicopter squadrons where gunnery is not so important as it is in bombers or fighter planes.

Now the question arises. How can we test transport, observation, and helicopter pilots to see whether they come up to certain standards? The answer is obvious—make them qualify in the prerequisites necessary for the successful completion of their

respective missions.

Score the transport pilot on his proficiency in small field landings and supply drops on specific targets. Check the observation pilot's ability to read maps and his skill in landing and taking off from small fields. The helicopter pilot, whose missions in a combat area are certainly vital, should be screened on his navigational ability, his skill in the use of terrain for cover, and the speed with which he can get in and out of small landing spots.

OF COURSE THE qualifications listed above are general in scope, and the completed plan must be more detailed. In addition, tests must be changed from year to year to keep in step with the times and new equipment. However, the principle remains unchanged, and the plan, once put into effect, will improve the efficiency of our transport, observation, and helicopter squadrons as well as our tactical squadrons.

During World War II it was not uncommon to have some pilots shoot down 10 or 15 enemy planes while their squadron mates who went up on the same missions ended up with a zero, and not the Japanese type.

What was the reason for this amazing difference in scores? Simply that some of the pilots were not capable of aiming-in on a moving tar-

get and getting hits. If a qualification program is set up, this deficiency can be discovered before the chips are down. The poor shots can then be trained in another type aircraft, where they can be of better use to the Marine Corps.

Another question arises: What do we do with the aviators who can't seem to qualify in aerial gunnery, bombing, or rocketry? Just because they can't hit targets doesn't mean they are not capable aviators. They may, indeed, be very good transport, observation, or helicopter pilots, where gunnery makes no particular difference.

It would be a great help to a personnel officer in the FMF to have aviators report in with their current aerial marksmanship qualifications in their file jacket so they could be assigned to the squadron where their particular talents could be exploited. No system in use today works very well. An aviator has an MOS which indicates he is a fighter, observation, transport, or helicopter pilot, but the MOS doesn't indicate how well he can use the ordnance of the aircraft he is flying.

I am sure our ground troops will feel more at ease if they know that the pilots behind the guns or bombs giving them air support are experts in their fields. When the troops call for bombs they can be confident



Left—Helicopter pilots should be tested for skill in spot landings

Right—When it's real close they like to know the pilot is an expert



they will be dropped on the target. When they call for supplies, they know that the pilot flying the aircraft has had practice in supply drops and will drop them where they are desired. When they have casualties and call for a helicopter, they know that the pilot flying the helicopter can land in rough terrain and evacuate the casualties if it is humanly possible.

In starting out the qualification program the first year, aviators could be given intensive training for a period of approximately one month. At the end of the month, a test would be conducted to see if they qualify with their aircraft weapons. There are many ideas as to how good an aviator should be before he is considered as qualified in his aircraft weapons. Qualification requirements might be as follows:

Fighter pilots firing on a target being towed at 20,000 feet at 140 knots should get 80 hits out of 800 rounds to qualify as expert, 60 hits to qualify as sharpshooter, and 40 hits to qualify as marksman.

Bomber pilots should be able to put 15 bombs out of 20 into a 50-foot circle to qualify as expert, 12 for sharpshooter, and 10 for marksman.

For rockets, the requirement should be about the same as for bombs.

Transport pilots should demonstrate small field landings, supply drops on designated targets, and navigation proficiency.

✿ **HELICOPTER PILOTS** should prove their skill in loading troops, supply drops, selecting landing sites, and landing in rough terrain.

Observation pilots should be proficient at landing in small areas, map reading, and target identification.

After aviators are assigned to squadrons according to their skills, then we can start thinking about inter-group competition in gunnery and bombing. This can extend right

on up through the aircraft wing until we have selected the best bomber and fighter squadrons.

Winning squadrons could be awarded trophies which would pass on to the best squadrons each year. Eventually we might think of having all-Marine competition in aviation specialties such as we do in the all-Marine rifle and pistol matches.

If this qualification program were adopted, we would have highly skilled squadrons ready to go on a few hours' notice, and Marine aviation could do a better job of giving air support to our ground troops at all times.

USMC

"DARKHORSE"

KEY

Attack routes of Darkhorse units

I/5

H/5

G/5

Composite Co

To Yudam-ni

I/7

H&S

3/7

H/7

I/5 passed through 3/7 at 1500, 1 Dec

Hill 1419

H/5 at 1800, 1 Dec

I/5 at 1930, 1 Dec

Composite Co joined 3/5 morning of 2 Dec

G/5 passed through I/5 morning of 2 Dec

Hill 1520

H/5 pinned down afternoon of 2 Dec

G/5 at 1200, 2 Dec

G/5 at 1800, 2 Dec

Composite Co at roadblock mid-afternoon of 2 Dec

Fox Hill

Toktong Pass



Composite Co and G/5 night of 2-3 Dec


H/5 at 0230, 3 Dec

H/5 at 0900, 3 Dec

To Hagaru-ri

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SYNOPSIS

With the entry of the Chinese Communists into Korea, the 1st Mar Div halted its advance after relieving enemy pressure from the right flank of the retreating Eighth Army. But large Chinese forces stood between the Marines and their return to the sea. The key to the drive would be the fight from Yudam-ni to Hagaru. After holding part of a joint perimeter around Yudam-ni, the 3d Bn, 5th Marines, known by its call sign of "Darkhorse," relieved 7th Marines units and was chosen to spearhead the attack along the MSR for both the 5th and 7th RCTs.

Dec

TK

PART II

AS THE MEN OF 3/5 MOVED down the MSR and through the joint command post of the two regimental combat teams, everything appeared confused and disorganized because of the tremendous activity. Regimental aid stations were loaded with casualties, and the road was clogged with personnel and vehicles of the entire force.

The 3d Bn, 7th Marines had started the attack along the MSR toward Hagaru, but it had not gone well. Little progress had been made and the assigned objective had not been reduced. Assault companies of 3/7 were widely separated on the ridges to the east and west and were beyond mutual support. H/7, attacking Hill 1419 on the west of the MSR, had suffered heavy casualties, and it was obvious that additional strength was needed to overcome the Chinese defenses.

The plan was such that 3/5 would pass through the middle of 3/7's lines in a column of companies. When this was done, Darkhorse would be situated on the immediate right flank of H/7 and could attack along the main supply route to outflank the stubborn resistance on Hill 1419. (See sketch, page 44.) But nothing was constant. Orders had to be changed rapidly and issued verbally to meet changing circumstances. There was no time available for long or considered planning.

Chinese in overwhelming numbers had moved in along the main supply route and were determined to deny it as an escape route for the Marines. The enemy had occupied all key terrain features from Yudam-ni to Hagaru with the exception of one

isolated knoll located many miles down the road at Toktong Pass. Between Yudam-ni and this outpost, held by F/7, there were seven strong enemy roadblocks facing 3/5.

The picture was not bright for Darkhorse and other units of the two Marine RCTs. Visions of the Yalu River and Christmas at home had long since vanished as the cold, tired, hungry Leathernecks began their fight to break the ring which the enemy had thrown up around them. Then, at long last, the shifting perimeter began stretching southward. The drive to open the MSR, vital to the survival of the beleaguered Marines, was starting. The attack along the corridor toward Hagaru had begun.

Darkhorse moved through 3/7's lines at about 1500 on 1 December 1950 in its role as spearhead for the entire force. How Co was in the lead followed by Item and George, with How's second platoon forward and the first and third in support.

One tank, the only one which the division had been able to get through to Yudam-ni, was assigned to the point, followed by two bulldozers and a small detachment of engineers. The forward position of the bulldozers and engineering personnel was necessary since the narrow road had to be repaired or roadblocks cleared. Also, looking to all possibilities, it would be necessary for the bulldozers to push the tank out of the way should it be knocked out. That tank leading the column, incidentally, was a tremendous morale factor for the Marines and, conversely, demoralizing for the enemy. Although the Chinese positions had to be taken by infantry, it was good to look down on the MSR and see the iron monster. Even the sound, one which only a rumbling tank can make, was reassuring.

After 3/5 had moved rapidly almost three-quarters of a mile, the Chinese opened up on the battalion from the high ground on both sides of the road. Lt Denzil Walden's platoon (2d Plt, C Co) sustained 14 casualties, and the advance was held up. Capt Schrier, commander of Item Co, and Capt Williamson, skipper of How Co, decided that Item

should assault the enemy positions to the left of the MSR and that How should hit those to the right. The battalion commander approved the plan, and H Co moved across the corridor and up the hill. By 1800, How had seized its objective despite enemy rifle fire, but Item, because of heavier resistance, did not reach its objective, the large spur north of Hill 1520, until 1930.

That night the temperature continued to drop until it hit 25 degrees below zero. Assault troops of H and I Cos were heavily spent, with the toll in casualties from the fighting and freezing weather beginning to show. The will to fight remained strong, however, since the initial successes of How and Item Cos had raised spirits and the battalion trains and supplies had forced their way through the clogged road.

H and I Cos were given a brief rest as the battalion consolidated its position before continuing the attack. Although the CO of Darkhorse had misgivings about pressing his assault at night over unfamiliar, precipitous terrain, he calculated that chances of success would be increased for the undersized companies if they moved during darkness. Too long a pause would allow the enemy to recover. Also, if the troops kept moving, even if very slowly, they would stay awake and alert; whereas, if they stopped, many would succumb to sleep and the cold.

So before midnight Item Co moved out from its first objective toward the next high ground, Hill 1520. As the men moved into the draw to their front, a killing cross-fire, directed from both flanks and Hill 1520, hit them. It was a heavy fight and the position was untenable.

Capt Schrier requested permission for his company to return to the initial objective so that he could better defend the MSR, and the CO of 3/5 concurred. Item hastily set up defenses to repel this latest serious threat.

The Chinese tactic at this point was to strike, drop back, fire a mortar mission, then withdraw again. Several times this procedure was followed with both Marine and enemy casualties high. Capt Schrier, hit in the neck, wounded for a second time, and too weak to continue to lead his men, refused to be evacuated until





he had turned over the remainder of his company to Lt Peterson and had extracted from him the promise he would hold at all costs. The officers and men of Item Co distinguished themselves that night by their leadership, skill in night fighting, and determination to hold their ground.

SSgt William G. Windrich, with a squad, initially held off the enemy attack long enough to permit Item to reorganize. Although he was wounded in the head by a hand grenade, he continued to fight and organized small groups of volunteers to evacuate wounded. Windrich was hit again in the leg during one of the early morning attacks, but he remained in action until he lapsed into unconsciousness and died.

ON ANOTHER SECTOR of the front, MSgt Dale L. Stropes was constantly on the move directing fire and arranging for evacuation of the wounded. He was hit twice himself, but continued with his unit until wounded again by an enemy mortar burst. Early in the morning he was evacuated to the aid station where he died.

1stLt Dorsie Booker, commanding the provisional artillery platoon which had been attached from C Battery of 1/11, kept his men in position and fighting. He reorganized his platoon following one of the heavy enemy counter-attacks and recaptured positions taken by the Chinese, thus stabilizing the company's lines. His leadership was outstanding

as he worked and fought with his men for five hours, effectively utilizing the ammunition and weapons of the dead and wounded who had been evacuated, and held the line until he was killed.

Just as Item had jumped off from its first objective shortly before midnight the previous night, communications had gone out and there was no direct contact between the command post and I Co during the darkness hours. Some casualties had arrived at the battalion aid station about midnight, but they had been wounded before the heavy attacks against Item had begun, so there was little knowledge in the CP of the fight going on in the hills to the left flank.

The CO of 3/5 sent runners to contact I Co after his communications failed, but they lost their way and were not seen until the next day. Not until the casualties started to arrive early next morning could an accurate appraisal of the Item situation be made.

The second section of the battalion aid station (a part of the rear echelon of the 3/5 CP consisting of H&S Co and the remaining elements of the battalion transportation—some 20 vehicles with supplies and equipment) had not cleared the 7th Marines lines until 2100, and it was 2300 before the personnel pulled up in position with the main elements of Darkhorse. They halted for the night, moving vehicles off the MSR into a rice paddy where they formed

a circle similar to those used in the days of the covered wagon for defense against the Indians. In the middle of the circle was a native hut which served as the aid station, later being referred to by 3/5 personnel as "Dante's Inferno."

A few casualties, as has been mentioned, started filtering in soon after the aid station was set up, and by early morning they were arriving in greatly increasing numbers. Seriously wounded personnel were treated and sent back to the regimental aid station, while the walking wounded who could provide security for the battalion train were kept with the main column.

Maj Swain, who had taken Maj Canney's place as executive officer, kept order in and around the aid station, and Chaplain Bernard Hickey performed a herculean spiritual task among the wounded and dying. The ExO commented that "Chaplain Hickey could not have been replaced except by our Blessed Lord Himself."

While Item had moved out toward its assigned objective the previous night, How Co on the right flank had been advancing simultaneously, receiving some not-too-accurate small arms and automatic weapons fire from the high ground to its right. As the How troops started up the ridge to their front, they could hear the enemy digging in at the top, and the company commander requested permission to occupy a concealed position in some pines on the

enemy's flank from which he could attack after an air strike in the morning. Darkhorse's CO approved the plan since the How advance had to be halted anyway until the Item situation was clarified.

At dawn, H/5 again began to receive small arms and automatic weapons fire from the high ground to its right and right rear. How returned the fire and jumped off, suffering some casualties but moving to within 50 yards of the enemy on top of the hill. Then the planes came.

✿ THE AIR STRIKE was very effective; at times, the rocket and strafing attacks were made within 30 yards of the Marines' own lines. As the last plane struck and gave the familiar wave of its wings, How charged up the hill, and by 1500 had routed the enemy and secured the position. Air strikes kept high ground to the right front neutralized so that H Co could by-pass it and move on.

That morning—it was 2 December — George Co counter-attacked through the Item Co lines, encountering some enemy firing small arms and an occasional automatic weapon but finding no strong, well-organized position. Few Chinese were left on the hill which Item had held through the night. Lt Peterson had only 11 men left, but 342 enemy dead were counted in the area as George Co began to move along the left flank of the MSR toward Hill 1520.

On the battalion level, the CO was reorganizing for the push forward. All gear such as tents, stoves, tables, cots, clothing rolls, and the like was ordered burned or destroyed to make room for casualties. Ammunition, fuel, and wounded were the priorities for vehicles.

Both George Co on the left flank and How Co on the right had been reduced to two-platoon strength. So, with the loss of Item Co, 3/5's CO requested another company for support from the regimental commander. The best that could be provided was a composite company made up of remnants of the 7th Marines. This outfit was to move down the road directly behind the tank to parallel G and H Cos in the hills to either flank.

By 1200, George Co had secured Hill 1520 from an estimated 50 to

80 Chinese and the company was cheered by the sight of Marines from 1/7 on the ridges to its left.¹ At first, George personnel thought that the Leatherneck ridgerunners were enemy troops ready to fire upon them, but the bouncing of the round sleeping bags fastened to cartridge belts left no doubt that they were Marines.



✿ PROGRESS DURING THE daylight hours of 2 December was slow, since the advance of the assault units was determined by the speed with which the long column of vehicles could move. The engineers, now under the command of TSgt Edwin Knox, (Lt Richards had been badly wounded and sent to the aid station during the night) utilized their only remaining bulldozer to clear Chinese roadblocks as quickly as possible.

By mid-afternoon, the composite company, advancing along the MSR between G and H Cos, ran into a serious situation. The Chinese had destroyed a small bridge over a deep stream bed, had blown part of the road, and had defended the roadblock with well-emplaced machine guns and supporting infantry. It was impossible for the engineers to begin repair.

Once more the column halted abruptly. George Co was directed to attack down the long spur above the Chinese, and the composite com-

¹1/7 moved over the high ground north of the MSR to effect relief of Fox Co and secure Toktong Pass (See *Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass* in May issue.)

pany started to maneuver in the defile below the MSR to outflank the enemy.

Within minutes after a call went out, Lts Greene and Corby, 3/5's FACs, had the ever-present Corsairs on target. The pilots put on an air show to behold. They came in low, hitting the enemy with everything they had, and barely skimmed the sharp ridge in the difficult pull-up at the end of their runs. When the F4Us completed their mission, the enemy machine guns had stopped firing for good, and shortly thereafter the position was over-run. But a long delay ensued as the engineers began the difficult job of constructing a by-pass and repairing the bridge.

✿ G Co ON THE HIGH ground to the left and the composite company along the MSR continued to attack while available personnel in the CP and those moving on the battalion train worked with the engineers to clear the roadblock. H Co, attacking on the right across the corridor from the MSR, was pinned down in a stream bed just halfway to its objective. No air support was available since the planes were being used to reduce enemy positions holding up the main column.

1stLt Ammer, artillery liaison officer for 3/5, relayed How's request for artillery fire to Capt Pierce, S-3 for 1/11, whose guns were some 5,000 to 6,000 yards to the rear. He gave the enemy coordinates, called for a round of white phosphorus and got the word that it was "on the way." The first burst was a little over, but corrections were made and the next was right on. The order "fire for effect" was given; 36 rounds were on their way. Lt Ammer waited, but no artillery. As it later turned out, How had been registering mortars at the same time the artillery strike was being called and it was white phosphorus mortar bursts that Lt Ammer had seen. The two WPs and the 36 HEs from 1/11 were lost in the hills of North Korea, never to be located.

Only once again in the southward trek to Hagaru did the spearheading 3/5 request and obtain an artillery mission. It was difficult to employ artillery effectively since the batteries were at great distances from the targets, the communications were poor,

and the situation as well as troops' positions changed rapidly. So Darkhorse had to rely primarily on its own mortars and Marine aviation to reach out in front of its lines and strike the enemy positions.

Snow was falling as night came, but How Co moved forward again under cover of the darkness. Stopping short of the enemy position on the high ground to the front, the H Co troops organized a frontal assault. With two platoons abreast and spread over a large section of the hill, they made the charge screaming and firing from the hip.

The Chinese evidently thought that the whole Marine division was coming at them because they jumped from their positions and fled while offering only feeble resistance. How secured the position at 0230 on 3 December after suffering only five casualties. Not until dawn

were they to discover their objective still lay ahead.

On the left flank, G Co had moved to the high ground southeast of Hill 1520 by nightfall of 2 December. The two platoons had been reduced to little more than two over-sized squads in the day-long fight and the company commander had been wounded and evacuated. 1stLt Camarata, the executive officer, took over until 1stLt Charlie Mize, assistant S-3 and a former commander of George Co, was ordered to reorganize the company.

The composite company had also suffered heavily in an 800-yard advance along the MSR during which it overcame several new roadblocks. By midnight the company's leading platoon had been halted by heavy enemy fire from the front and from the hill mass on their right flank, which was the H Co objective.

Spirits were sagging that night, and the will to fight, even the will to live, was fading. The weary, worn Marines were being lulled to sleep by the soft snowfall and the meager warmth of their clothing. The battalion train and the long vehicle column following 3/5 had halted. The picture for Darkhorse was not bright.

GEORGE CO RETURNED to the MSR to reorganize and make preparations to pass through the composite company which had been badly disorganized by enemy pressure during the night. And to make matters worse, the tank which had been spearheading the move along the MSR had gone off the road and couldn't get back on.

The men were so tired that they were reluctant to move. Time was important, however, and 3/5's CO began to increase the pressure. Worn-out bodies would not remain alert unless pushed. But tempers were sharp where there was life. No one liked being disturbed. It was someone else's turn to do the dirty work, they reasoned. They needed a rest. Why should they work in the dark?

Irritated, angry voices barked up and down the line. The S-4 found a chain among the supplies and the bulldozer was brought forward to pull the tank back on the road. The chain broke once, but on the second try it was shortened, another attempt was made, and it worked. Personnel were alerted up and down the line, and by the early morning light Darkhorse began to look alive.

The newly-appointed commander of G/5 talked to the remaining personnel of his company, 45 in all counting 11 artillerymen. "Never during the entire period in Korea did I see men look so hopeless and seem to care so little," Lt Mize recounted later. "I had to recognize their problems. G Co had been fighting for four days. They had been the last to leave Yudam-ni and had been pulled out of the lines there under fire. They had eaten very little. Frozen food was available, but these men, too busy to eat much of the time, were now too tired to stomach the frozen, unpalatable stuff. But it was a fight to live. Having fought and lived with these men for 15 months, I knew that if they





were called upon to go the limit in this fight, they would do it." They did!

G/5, with attached artillerymen, was reorganized into one reinforced platoon. Lt Cahill led the infantry with the first sergeant, Don Faber, as his platoon sergeant. Lt O'Connell led the mortar section.

George Co proceeded forward and passed through the composite company. How Co on the ridge to the right had discovered that they had taken only the first knoll of the hill and that their real objective still lay several hundred yards ahead of them. The company prepared to attack as the enemy in the hills on both sides of the road began increasing their fire on the MSR.

From positions on the road, hundreds of Chinese were seen moving to reinforce their positions on the hill facing How Co. They came from a heavily wooded area across a saddle to the southeast. Darkhorse directed all efforts to aiding H Co in its plight, and George, in the lead on the MSR with the tank, moved quickly into firing positions.

Artillery was requested, but could not reach the target. Lt House, act-

ing as FO as well as platoon commander² displaced his 81s as far forward as possible to bring mortar fire down on the enemy. And despite the heavy overcast a hurried request was made for air. Through it all, How's skipper was kept informed of the fast-developing situation and of the request for air support.

Darkhorse needed help to call its shots. To lift the overcast more was needed than the science and skill of the Marines. But help came and the artillery liaison officer was heard to yell in an excited and grateful voice, "I got them. I got them."

There was a break in the overcast and the Corsairs came zooming through and over the lines. The battalion commander called for an air strike to aid H/5, and it was a beautiful sight. The Corsairs roared in over the enemy, plastered them with napalm bombs and rockets, and made strafing runs. The Marine flyers literally smothered the Chinese with fire, knocking out all but one

²All forward observer teams had previously become casualties. Their equipment either had been destroyed or turned over to infantry units before this time.

of the machine guns holding up How Co. Pfc E. J. Cordova got that one with his BAR and grenades. The assault was a complete success.

How's seizure of this last vital objective completed the task assigned 3/5 three days earlier. G Co, with an additional platoon made up of H&S personnel under the command of Lt Bowman, drove rapidly down the MSR. Whichever way the enemy fled they came under deadly fire from Marine infantry weapons and from Marine aviation's strafing and bombing attacks. The darkest night of a long stay in Korea had turned into the brightest day. Morale and spirits soared.

By noon, 3/5 reached the positions at Toktong Pass occupied by 1/7 and F/7. The Marines had converged, the enemy had been routed, and the MSR had been opened. The column of vehicles for the entire force was moving. Within 24 hours, all of the personnel from the two regimental combat teams would move into Hagaru-ri and join other elements of the 1st Mar Div. From this point on, the Chinese would be unable to stop the Marines in their advance to the sea.

USMC

KOREA AWARDS



Navy Cross

2dLt George W. Alexander, Jr., TSgt Quinton T. Barlow, Pfc Robert E. Beatty, 2dLt Charles G. Little.

Silver Star

Sgt James E. Banner, LtCol Roy J. Batteredon, Jr. (2d), Pfc Elbert Bunch, Capt Denton P. Clyde, Capt Howard J. Connolly, Pfc Charlie J. Davis, 2dLt Hal W. Field, 2dLt Herbert F. Fischer, Pfc Ruben Garcia-Morales, Sgt Rudolph R. Gustafson, Cpl Charles E. Haggett, 2dLt Robert R. Jackson, Cpl Patrick T. McGonagle, Capt Frederick C. McLaughlin.

Cpl James L. McMinn, Cpl Anthony J. Mucci, Sgt Walter M. Muryasz, Capt Bernard W. Peterson, Cpl Richard L. Pettit, 2dLt David F. Reid, Cpl Raymond E. Sice, Capt Robert B. Sinclair, Pfc Francis P. Soucie, Capt John P. Sutherland, Pfc Edward J. Taggart, Cpl Charles R. Taylor, Pfc Gene F. Thomas, 2dLt Daniel Wills, Capt George B. Woodbury, 2dLt Gary L. Yundt.

Legion of Merit

Col George S. Bowman, Jr., Col John P. Coursey, Col Elmer T. Dorsey, Col Loren E. Haffner, Maj Donald E. Kramer, Brig-Gen Frank H. Lamson-Scribner, Col Walter F. Laver, LtCol Oscar F. Peatross, Col William F. Prickett, Maj Richard M. Remington, LtCol Walter E. Reynolds, LtCol Carlo A. Rovetta, Col Martin A. Severson, Col Harry N. Shea.

Distinguished Flying Cross

1stLt John W. Andre (5th), Maj Albert J. Bibee, Maj Marion B. Bowers (3d), Col George S. Bowman, Jr., LtCol Manual Brilliant, 1stLt Robert R. Brown, Maj Edmund Bushser, Jr. (3d), Col John P. Coursey, LtCol Philip L. Crawford (2d), Capt. James R. Curzon, Col Elmer T. Dorsey, Maj Charles E. Dove, Maj John M. Dufford, Capt Lynwood V. Fletcher, LtCol Maurice W. Fletcher.

Capt Norman W. Flinn, Jr. (4th), Maj Marshall C. Gregory, Maj Jesse T. Hastings, Jr. (2d), Maj Gordon V. Hodde (2d), Maj Frederick E. Hughes (3d), 2dLt William K. Hutchings, LtCol Homer G. Hutchinson, Jr., 1stLt Edgar K. Jacks, Maj Dan H. Johnson, Capt William H. Johnson, Capt Robert King, Jr., 2dLt James W. Kirk, Capt Virgil V. Koenig, Capt Cecil B. LaFayette, Maj Robert L. Lamar.

Maj Reinhardt Leu (2d), Capt Patrick M. Maginnis, MSgt Render M. Matthews, Capt Dwight E. Mayo, 2dLt Marcus D. McAnally, Capt Leslie T. McFadden, Maj Harold N. Mehaffey (3d), Maj Alfred T.

Moret, Jr. (3d), Capt Roger A. Morris, Capt William G. Morse, 2dLt Charles H. Noble, Jr., 2dLt Donald L. Parks, Capt Thomas M. Place, Jr., Capt Edgar F. Remington (2d).

Capt Albert C. Schoner, Col Martin A. Severson (2d), Capt Edward Shamis, Capt Mercer R. Smith, Capt John N. Snapper (2d), Capt Russel H. Stoneman, Maj Robert A. Strieby (2d), Maj Orville R. Swick, Capt Joseph J. Travers, MSgt Ralph J. Tubbs (2d), 2dLt John J. Unterkofler, 2dLt Ramon S. Villareal, Capt William L. Walker, Capt James E. Wilson, Jr.

Navy and Marine Corps Medal

Cpl Terrell R. Roulston.

Bronze Star

Cpl Manuel G. Alvarado, Maj Russell G. Arndt, Maj Ernest Bealer, Pfc Eugene J. Beaudette, TSgt Rex G. Beecher, Pfc John M. Beffel, Jr., Maj Robert T. Bell, Pfc Charles W. Bonny, Pfc Charles G. Borowsky, 2dLt Walter A. Boyle, Capt John Brooks, 1stLt Robert N. Burhans, LtCol Harry O. Buzhardt, Pfc Willie D. Cardin, Pfc Bobbie L. Carr, 2dLt Arthur L. Charlton, Jr., Capt Henry A. Checkloun.

Maj William C. Chip, 2dLt Duane W. Chisman, MSgt Jack R. Christensen, Pfc John T. Colleran, Pfc Charles R. Connelly, Jr., TSgt Jimmy A. Corbet, Pfc Paul L. Cornaglia, 2dLt Frank V. Costanza, SSgt Fayette D. Crawford, Pfc William J. Curtin, LtCol William H. Cushing, Cpl Robert DeCarlo, 1stLt Thomas J. Deen, Jr., LtCol Elkin S. Dew, 2dLt Donald L. Diamond, Sgt Monte D. Dittmer, Cpl Norman H. Dose.

1stLt Milton D. Drummond, Jr., Sgt William A. Duffy, LtCol Fenlon A. Durand, SSgt Hubert E. Eager, Jr., Pfc Clifford E. Ferguson, 2dLt John H. Field, Capt James R. Flores, Capt John F. Foley, Pfc Charles R. Foster, MSgt George E. Foster, Cpl Ronnie W. Fukuoka, 1stLt Leonard C. Gademsky, Capt James F. Gallagher, Pfc Kenneth S. Galloway, 1stLt Harry L. Gary, 2dLt John L. Geismar.

Sgt Ralph G. Getman, TSgt Louis Ghuzman, LtCol Bernard W. Giebler, Sgt Joseph E. Gogins, 2dLt William P. Gorski (2d), Maj James E. Graaff, Maj Lawrence L. Graham, Sgt Charles Grigelis, Sgt Edward E. Gwizdala, Cpl. Duane H. Hansen, TSgt John L. Hargiss, Capt Murray V. Harlan, Jr., 2dLt John W. Harris, Maj Edmond P. Hartsock, LtCol Robert M. Haynes, Sgt Jack L. Henderson.

2dLt George N. Hill, Pfc Joseph L. A. Hindery, Cpl Virgil L. Hite, Jr., Maj John K. Hogan, Cpl Kenneth F. Howe, SSgt Russell I. Hudson, 2dLt Eugene O. Irving, Jr., Pfc Charles D. Jarrell, Pfc J. L. Jenkins.

Maj Robert M. Jenkins, LtCol Oscar T. Jensen, Jr., Maj Floyd M. Johnson (3d), Pfc Ronald E. Kespohl, Cpl Benjamin G. Kline, 2dLt Stanley Knowlton, Cpl Duane G. Kowalski.

SSgt Ralph C. Krupka, Cpl Henry C. LaGrone, Jr., LtCol Max H. LaGrone, Maj Robert L. LaMar, Sgt Darrell C. Lanham, Sgt Cornelius N. Larkin, MSgt Raymond E. Leggett, SSgt Joseph J. Louder, TSgt Donald J. Lupo, Pfc James E. Lyon, 1stLt Daniel K. Macklin, 2dLt Bruce D. MachLachlan, Pfc Ernest Maddron, 2dLt James F. Mahoney, Pfc James J. Mahoney, Maj Roland S. Mangel.

1stLt Donald L. Mann, Cpl John T. Marks, SSgt Arnold J. Marsili, Pfc Robert H. Martin, Pfc Alfred A. Martinez, Pfc Harry W. Martucci, 1stLt Andrew V. Marusak (2d), Capt Charles C. Matthews, Maj Philip H. McArdle, Capt William S. McCarson, Pfc Corbett A. McCommis, Sgt Charles L. McConnell, Pfc Dale E. McCullick, LtCol John McGuckin, Capt Frederick C. McLaughlin.

SSgt Arthur J. McMahon, Pfc James C. McMasters, Jr., Pfc Thomas J. McNamara, Pfc Morford R. McWilliams, 1stLt Robert L. Meade, Maj Harold N. Mehaffey, 1stLt Willard D. Merrill, Cpl. Paul E. Miller, Sgt Louis J. Minassian, Pfc Daniel E. Moody, Pfc Luther D. Morehead, Jr., Capt Patrick H. Mucciaccio, Sgt George K. Munerlyn, 2dLt Roger J. Murphy, Pfc William J. O'Leary, Jr.

Capt James B. Ord, Jr., Cpl Teddy Padilla, Pvt Charles E. Parkerson, 2dLt Jack D. Parsons, 2dLt John W. Pennington, Pfc Nicholas R. Polifroni, LtCol James A. Pounds, III, Cpl Philip A. Punchard, 2dLt Robert D. Purcell, 2dLt Robert C. Rice, Maj Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr., Cpl Arnold Rosenberg, Cpl Augustus E. Schuster, Sgt Joseph P. Sheffel, Jr., Capt Anthony J. Skotnicki, 2dLt Richard B. Swartz, TSgt Nathan L. Thomas, Maj Roy H. Thompson, 2dLt Harry Wilder.




Since the subject is machine accounting, this article submits that machine accounting represents not perfection, but accelerated and scientifically proven progress. This progress has permitted the Marine Corps to shed many of the administrative, fiscal, and supply bonds imposed by an overlong adherence to procedural lines developed through the years for a Corps of 10,000 to 25,000 officers and men.

Today, despite the fact the Marine Corps has adopted this system, and the fact the system is working as planned except for those far flung units unable to capitalize on the po-

[illegible]

m a c h i n e s



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By Capt Bill L. Parham

Fill The Billet

tential benefits of a mechanical process (which exception does present a serious problem), we have our prophets of impending disaster. They are easily recognized, however, being disposed to voice statements substantially as follows: "I don't know anything about machine accounting, but I don't like it—You people (machine accounting personnel) are famous only for your ability to turn out masses of inaccurate information. Your reports are no good. The information is too old. We ought to throw out the machines and go back to the muster roll, the change sheet, the report of strength, etc., etc. I know all about machines. You just put the cards in and the answers come out. You're a bunch of "empire builders" and (a sternly wagging finger) we don't want another empire."

Strangely, however, during infrequent periods of mellowness these same individuals are addicted to propounding questions of great significance, which are left to the reader to fathom: "What is a unit diary? What is a monthly personnel roster? Can you give us this information? (Accompanied by various vague gestures.) What is a reporting unit?

So, you've got the dope! What good is it?"

This article is not intended to be unjustly critical of the opponents of machine accounting as established by the Marine Corps. They have a case and it has obvious merit. On the other hand, the exponents of machine accounting have an equally good case. Let us examine in part the case of the opposition as the writer sees it.

7. **ALTHOUGH MACHINE** accounting for the Marine Corps was born in 1941 and was used for personnel accounting purposes at Marine Corps Headquarters level from 1942 through November 1949, comparatively few personnel knew of its existence. During this same period the supply department and the Division of Aviation made increasing demands for electric accounting machine services and, as a result, were in a better position to accept the reality of a personnel accounting system dependent upon operations of strategically dispersed machine accounting sections.

The first widely disseminated official information regarding the new personnel accounting system ap-

peared on 30 September 1949 and Marine Corps General Order Number 47 was promulgated on 12 October 1949, a bare six weeks before the new personnel accounting system was to become effective.

As a result of the failure to publicize the work electric accounting machines performed during World War II and the resultant lack of knowledge of the capabilities of these machines, December 1949 came along all too suddenly. With just six weeks to prepare themselves, officers and enlisted personnel were not quite prepared to handle the job.

In Marine Corps General Order No. 47 we were able to trace the origin of an erroneous idea that machine accounting is an "empire builder." Machine accounting officers were designated as members of the special staff of the command, the machine accounting sections (USMC Machine Records Installations) were made integral parts of the command, and accounting jurisdiction was assigned to commands. But, machine accounting officers were specifically authorized to conduct routine and technical business of the accounting system directly with accounting jurisdictional activ-

ities, with other machine accounting sections, and with Headquarters Marine Corps.

Machine accounting officers were also authorized to sign all official correspondence of a routine or technical nature emanating from "their" installations. In the eyes of commands concerned, this authorization appeared to preclude effective control and to negate the responsibility assigned in the same order.

☛ SHORTLY AFTER the effective date of the new personnel accounting system, reporting units and intermediate commands found themselves steadily and increasingly deluged with mail from machine accounting officers eagerly initiating corrective action for commands exercising accounting jurisdiction.

These letters were, and remain, purely routine and in no way imply an authority not specifically authorized, but they were originated by machine accounting officers and were in some cases pretty abrupt. Copies went to the parent command of the offending unit. It looked bad for the unit and to the parent command it must have been somewhat confusing trying to determine just who was running what. It probably seemed impossible that so many errors could be made; the idea that machine accounting officers might be drunk with power probably occurred, while others considered that the trend demonstrated the inadequacies of the new system. These unhappy days were the best proof of the potential worth of the system. Though there is no evidence to support the contention, it is safe to assume the same number of errors were being made prior to the implementation of the new system.

☛ HOWEVER, UNDER the muster roll, change sheet, etc. system, errors for the most part remained hidden, for there was no method whereby the accuracy of these reports could be verified with any real assurance. With electric accounting machines it was now possible to check and correct errors.

In some cases machine accounting officers were undoubtedly overly enthusiastic in their efforts to do a better job than other machine accounting sections and unnecessarily of-

fended units and intermediate commands.

There also seems to be little doubt that the new personnel accounting system was initially oversold, which was probably the worst thing that could have happened. Those personnel who were indoctrinated in the new system were shown the advantages and the amazing capabilities of the machines and the new system. Little or nothing of the limitations of the machines and the system were explained to them.

Watching the machines work and knowing the number of functions they perform, one often loses sight of the fact that the machines, effective as they are, do not have the power to reason. Thus it was that when the new system was put into effect, personnel sometimes lost sight of the fact that the information produced by the machine was only as accurate as the information that was put into it originally.

It is considered that the exponents of machine accounting have a case substantially as follows:

World War II demonstrated conclusively that the personnel accounting system used then was inadequate and that a change should be made prior to another wartime emergency.

To meet this problem the Commandant created the Personal Records and Reports Board and directed, among other things, that it devise a coordinated records and reporting system that would procure, record, and disseminate the required information adequately, yet would employ a minimum of personnel, would place a minimum burden on field units, and would be able to expand in the event of mobilization. After almost two years of the most intensive study by a staff of experienced field officers under the direction of Brig-Gen (now MajGen) Robert H. Pepper, such a system had been developed and thoroughly field tested for a period in excess of 11 months with units of a combined strength of four percent of the entire Marine Corps.

Company grade officers and enlisted personnel of all ranks were required to operate the new machine accounting sections and were ordered to Headquarters Marine Corps for intensive training. They were not, for the most part, volunteers

for the type of duty involved. They were simply uprooted from previous specialties and trained as machine accounting officers, machine accountants for personnel and supply, personnel accounting analysts, and machine operators.

It had been determined, for obvious reasons, that these machine installations should not function subordinate to any interested agency. This determination caused technical control to pass from the supply department to the administrative division. Machine accounting sections were thus established as service-type activities—neither supply nor personnel. It followed, naturally, that a similar establishment was necessary in the field. Machine accounting sections were therefore authorized for each command having a machine installation as a part thereof, independent of general staff activities as such, but performing applicable accounting machine functions for all sections, reporting units, and intermediate commands.

☛ IN NO INSTANCE has any department of Headquarters Marine Corps attempted to monopolize or control these machine installations. The officer in charge of the machine accounting branch of Headquarters Marine Corps is an unrestricted field officer subject to normal rotation.

Machine accounting officers and their long suffering assistants are executing personnel accounting for their commands only as a part of overall operations. The idea that machine accounting officers exercise any control over personnel accounting (other than that control necessary to provide required services and as specifically directed by Marine Corps General Order No. 47) is erroneous. Machine accounting sections perform many mechanical functions in no way related to personnel accounting. In the machine accounting section of Headquarters Marine Corps, although personnel accounting is the largest single function when considered as a part of the whole of that section's routine, it became an incidental operation among approximately thirty-four others of equal importance.

Machine accounting sections are, in fact, integral parts of the com-

mands where located and machine accounting officers are no different from other officers of the special staff.

For the sake of further discussion let us concede that both adherents and opponents have points in their favor and carry on from there, examining machine accounting in relation to its place in the Marine Corps and its service-type functions. But first let's take a look at the machines and how they are operated.

Electric accounting machines most commonly employed by the Marine Corps are not classified items of equipment, and it is believed that all personnel should be acquainted, however briefly, with their general functions. Here they are:

a. The alphabetic duplicating punch is an electrically operated machine employed in transcribing source information into punch card format. Its operation is quite similar to that of an electric typewriter.

b. The alphabetical verifier is electrically operated and used in the verification of information previously transcribed into punch card form.

c. The collator is also electrically operated and handles 240-480 cards per minute depending on the job. It is used for filing two sets of cards together in any predetermined sequence with controls to insure accuracy, for filing two sets of cards together simultaneously selecting obsolete cards, for checking the sequence of a file of cards, for matching one file against another, for the selection of specific cards, and for certain combinations of the above. This machine can be most trying, indeed, and downright difficult at times.

d. The sorter is electrically operated and tosses cards around at the rate of 450-650 per minute. It places a file in a desired sequence by sorting on columns, the sequence of which is to be established. This is a simple, efficient, and unassuming machine.

e. The automatic reproducing punch, also electrically operated, reproduces cards at the rate of 100 per minute and compares the reproduction with the source material. It is used for reproducing the old and unchanged information from a card and the new and changed information from another card into a con-



Key punch — the information is put in here

solidated new card, simultaneously dropping out the obsolete information. It is used for punching summaries of information accumulated by the alphabetical machine, when impulsed to do so by that machine. It's simple if you know how. Otherwise, it's impossible.

f. The alphabetical interpreter is electrically operated and is used to interpret into alphabetic or numeric characters the holes punched in cards fed into it. Strictly routine.

g. The alphabetical accounting machine is chuck full of relays, selectors, condensers, and many miles of electric wiring. It will list (type) at the rate of 80 cards or 6,400 characters per minute and tabulate (add) at the rate of 150 cards per minute. The machine is equipped with counters for accumulating totals of information. It is capable of selecting for listing or tabulating specific cards while ignoring others. It is used for balancing to predetermined totals. It is a versatile machine and its product is the end result of the labors of all of the other machines. It has a frightening control panel and is pretty tough and temperamental.

Now each of these machines excepting the punch, verifier, and sorter are activated by control panels of varying complexity which must be wired by machine operators for any operation. These machines, having no initiative, must be told exactly what to do. After receiving their orders via control panels and related switch settings, they will carry

them out with a high degree of accuracy.


In order to master these metal marvels, personnel must attain a high technical knowledge of their internal functioning. They must learn what the machines can do and how to give the orders. They must, in addition, know what is to be done, which requires a comprehensive knowledge of every operation currently being executed.

What, generally, has the new personnel accounting system, with its reliance on machine accounting sections, done for the overall Marine Corps?

That is a big question, so let's attempt to answer it with just enough detail and impartiality, avoiding flagrant verbosity and sticking to facts!

It replaced the muster roll card with the individual record card, but admittedly with little appreciable benefit to commands, and it replaced the change sheet with the unit diary. It's a different story here, for this step resulted in considerable audit, via mechanical means, of information reported into the system. This operation insured greater accuracy and through mechanical comparison eliminated errors of duplication and errors in substance formerly undetected. It finally permitted consolidation, on a Marine Corps-wide level, of current personnel information never before available on this scale.

We're still sticking to facts. It replaced the muster roll with a ma-



Interpreter — G-2's the holes

chine-prepared and machine-balanced monthly personnel roster, with an average man-hour saving at battalion level alone of 107 hours per month. It also eliminated the requirement for the report of strength (NAVMC 49) by substitution of machine reports, with an average man-hour saving at battalion level of 46 man hours per month. For this alone, administrative personnel should give thanks.

It greatly reduced the frequency of requests of the Commandant of the Marine Corps for one-time or recurring manually prepared special reports, all of which, it will be acknowledged by those bearing the brunt of efforts to assemble and verify information for such reports, required many hours of research and clerical effort at all command levels.

It provided Headquarters with a wide variety of current personnel information for assignment and planning purposes through field machine accounting section consolidation, and monthly submission of tabulations and rosters. This information was available, on an average, only 15 days behind actual occurrence of the status reported. Such timeliness and consolidation of pertinent information was not possible prior to adoption of the present system.

Let's look at one example. Through the maintenance of infor-

mation relative to categories of reserve personnel, the planning for and assignment of replacements for reservists about to be released has been greatly facilitated. The system has made the same type information used successfully by HQMC available to reporting units and intermediate commands; i.e., categories of reserve personnel, their assignment to and release from active duty (dates), their specialties and their locations.

And there's more information available. The personnel status card, initially prepared from the individual record card, is kept up to date through the processing of unit diaries and monthly personnel roster audits. These cards contain the following information:

- (a) Name and service number with a special indicator designating Korea veterans and Women Marines.
- (b) Rank, date of rank, and changes in rank, with the dates such changes were made.
- (c) Primary MOS.
- (d) Component and class, and if a reservist, the category.
- (e) Contract and duty limitations.
- (f) Officer's first and additional MOS.
- (g) Enlisted pay entry base date and tour date (where he is and how long he has been there).

This card is loaded, for in addition it contains special designation on aviators, mail clerks, officer candidates, etc., and the number of dependents the individual claims plus the date last departed for overseas or date last returned to the continental limits of the U.S.

Finally, it contains strength category (chargeable, non-chargeable, etc.) and the reporting unit's alphabetic and numeric designation.

No, that isn't all. The qualification card, which is prepared and maintained just like the status card, contains, in addition to standard


identifying information, first and second additional MOS, first and second service schools completed; civilian education and occupation, language qualifications from Africans through Yiddish, country of foreign residence and both composite and individual test scores.

☛ **THERE'S STILL MORE.** The personnel static card is maintained by Headquarters Marines Corps and contains component and class; birth date; place of birth; place of legal residence; place enlisted, inducted or appointed; term in years of contract; source of entry; contract limitation; rank to which initially appointed; and term in years of contract extensions.

Then there's a batch control card, employed primarily for balancing purposes, which shows authorized and actual strengths of reporting units in addition to other items.

Now that everyone knows what the system should be able to furnish, there are probably a few who would like a "for instance." Well, here are a few. You want to know how many privates of the regular Marine Corps speak Dalmatian, who they are, what was their civilian education, and what are their composite test

Collator—the brain in the system




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Sorter — a file in a desired sequence

scores. Can machine accounting furnish the answer? Yes.

Here's another and more realistic example. You want an alphabetical roster of all corporals who have been overseas for twelve months, who have been in grade for a minimum of twelve months, and who hold a primary MOS with corporal as the terminal rank. It can be had. You want a tabulation in sequence by MOS with a total and spread of ranks of all personnel who will be due for discharge in any given month. You can get it. The potential is great.

For those who may consider the information inaccurate or too old to be of value, there is but one best answer. You are the source. The information is as current as you make it. You are the determining agent of how much unnecessary delay there will be in reporting changes. It is your system. Machine accounting sections provide service to the system for your benefit.

✦ SINCE THE personnel accounting system and its reliance on the several commands having machine accounting sections is obviously the primary assault objective, the discussion of machine accounting section "inroads" into other fields will be limited to identifying a majority of those fields and the general types of

work performed on a service basis. This will be done as quickly and as painlessly as possible.


Machine accounting sections function for the supply department in the collection, maintenance, processing, and preparation of stock status reports via a stock status field reporting card (punch card) method for categories of supply items. Specifically, all engineer, electronics, general supply, motor transport, and ordnance supply items are included. The stock status reports prepared consist of a mass of detailed information such as nomenclature, stock number, reporting stations, supply depots reporting, reporting month, class of material, non-replenishable demands (transfers to other depots, disposition of surplus, adjustments, etc.), replenishable demands (issues, sales, expenditures, etc.), total outstanding obligations (due out), expected receipts (due in, balance on hand, serviceable, and available for issue), unit of issue, safety level, operating level, stockage objective, and requisition objective. These are only examples—there are many more.

In addition to the several personnel and supply operations of machine accounting sections, they assist in the computation, from supplied factors, of tables of equipment and of tables of organization, proc-

essing for total authorized strengths by rank and MOS and by table of organization, actual, projected, or composite.

There is, of course, no climax to this article. The climax when finally realized will be that day when each officer and man in the Marine Corps gets behind the personnel accounting system with the realization that, although not a perfect system, it is a better system and materially assists in its continued improvement. All commands having machine accounting sections and exercising accounting jurisdiction must accept these sections with confidence. Reporting units and intermediate commands must fully realize that machine accounting sections exist only to be of service and that machine accounting officers exercise no mystic control. Everyone also will have to realize that machine accounting and personnel accounting are not synonymous terms and responsible officers and men will have to fully acquaint themselves with their respective accounting systems and the capabilities and limitations of electric accounting machines. And finally, machine accounting officers must learn to present their somewhat technical information clearly, logically, patiently, and with tact to those who have not had an opportunity to familiarize themselves with machine accounting.

US ♣ MC



passing in review

BOOKS OF
INTEREST TO
OUR READERS

This is the Corps . . .

BATTLE CRY—Leon Uris. 505 pages.
New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
\$3.75

Leon Uris has written a novel of Marines going to war, telling how the "old breed" molded the "new breed" while the two were merging into the Marine Corps. Although primarily concerned with the radio squad of the 2d Bn, 6th Marines, it could be the story of almost any Leatherneck unit in World War II.

From Iceland, where Mac, a multi-hashmarked, battle-scarred old salt, introduces himself to readers, to Saipan, where battalion CO Sam Huxley finally gets his beachhead, the book moves quickly, taking in the details of training and combat while remaining true to the story it tells.

The reader—as well as several members of the radio squad—receives his indoctrination into the whys and wherefores of the Marine Corps at San Diego. The first taste of discipline, the sand hikes, the bucket brigades, the field days, the morning double-time, the long wait for morning chow, all give uninitiated readers an insight into the first lessons in a Marine's training.

The Marine himself will be impressed by the realism of the boot camp passages; indeed, he will be surprised at the realism throughout. He can say of the first pages, "This is boot camp," just as he can say of later chapters, "This is the Marine Corps."

Incidents which occur on liberty and in training, both stateside and in New Zealand, are humorous and sad. The hopes, troubles, and joys of an 18-year-old in love and away from home are as realistically told as those of the old salt, who "called Jap bluffs on the Yangtze Patrol a decade before Pearl Harbor."

Following its training, the squad goes to war—to Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and Saipan. The men go

through hell, the hell normal in combat; they have their troubles, the troubles normal in combat; they experience normal reactions, normal at least to Marines in combat. Some die, leaving their dreams and hopes with their lives on the battlefield, but those who die do not leave their ideals.

Battle Cry is powerful not so much because of its characterization, but rather because of its ability to draw the readers into its pages. When you have read the book, you have lived it.

Reviewed by Capt W. J. Nietschmann

Army in a Wilderness . . .

BROADAX AND BAYONET—Francis Paul Prucha, 236 pages, illustrated. Madison, Wisconsin: State Historical Society of Wisconsin. \$4.00



This is not a battle account nor is it an analysis of tactics or strategy. It does not pretend to be. *Broadax and Bayonet* is a factual account of how the United States Army helped to develop that part of the Northwest which now comprises northern Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Minnesota.

For nearly a half century prior to the Civil War a small, efficient Army

supplied the necessary buffer between the pioneer and the Redskin. As the settler pushed up river along the fertile inroads of the upper Mississippi Valley, small, isolated Army posts, such as old Fort Dearborn and Fort Howard (now the site of Chicago and Green Bay), preceded him. These posts became the primary means for maintaining law for enforcing regulations governing the White Man's dealings with the Indian and, in many cases, for executing treaties with the Indian.

The troops hewed their own garrisons and roads out of the wilderness, cultivated crops to augment their subsistence and, of necessity, built schools, churches, and libraries to serve their needs. Such was the non-military role played by the Army in the development of the Northwest.

Although this is not a "must" book, the average military reader will find it is a new and significant contribution to an understanding of our national development.

Reviewed by Maj C. E. Waller

Yugoslav Leader . . .

TITO—Vladimir Dedijer, 443 pages.
New York: Simon and Shuster.
\$5.00

The life of Josip Broz, better known today as Tito, falls into the popularly recognized pattern of the Communist leader—up to a point. The pattern is that of low birth, early poverty, membership in the Communist Party. From there the path leads through agitations, conflicts, jails, violence, and finally recognition and leadership. Where the pattern ceases to apply in the case of Tito is the point of his break with the Soviet Union. At that moment he stands alone as a singular and unusual man.

When the German invasion occurred, Tito rallied a resistance movement. Tito's movement was, in fact, one of several. The other major resistance movement centered

M/Sgt.
Harold E. Wilson, USMCR
Medal of Honor



He Held On All Night

OUT OF THE SPRING NIGHT, the Red banzai attack hit like a thunderstorm. The darkness exploded into a nightmare of flaming confusion. But Sergeant Wilson went into action at once, rallying his hard-pressed men.

Bullets wounded his head and leg; disabled both arms. Refusing aid, he crawled, bleeding, from man to man, supplying ammunition, directing fire, helping the wounded.

As the attack grew fiercer, a mortar shell blew him off his feet. Still, dazed

and weakened, he held on, leading the fight all night till the last Red assault was beaten off. At dawn, by sheer courage, the Sergeant had saved not only his position, but the precious lives of his men.

"In Korea," says Sergeant Wilson, "I didn't think about where our weapons came from—I just thanked God they were there.

"Now, back home, I realize what's behind those arms. The united strength of millions of thrifty, hard-working

folks like you—who are making America safer by investing in U. S. Defense Bonds. Maybe you've thought you were just saving money. Believe me, you're saving men's lives, too!"

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around Draja Mihailovich. Initially, it was Mihailovich's movement which enjoyed the acclaim of the free world and even of Soviet Russia. Tito's struggle went unrecognized and largely unaided, but gradually his position gained preeminence in the eyes of the West and he received military assistance. With the end of the war Tito was the undisputed leader of Yugoslavia and received recognition as such.

Very rapidly Soviet Russia set up machinery to absorb the Balkan and adjacent countries. At this point

Stalin ran into the Yugoslav nationalism which had been immeasurably strengthened by the common struggle for liberation, and Yugoslavia defied Soviet Russia.

Vladimir Dedijer is particularly well-suited to tell this absorbing story. He is the present editor of *Borba*, the leading Yugoslav paper, and was a partisan fighter and a member of the Yugoslav delegation to the United Nations. In addition, a good portion of the book is written in Tito's own words, and Tito has personally endorsed the work.

For the student of military operations, there is only a generalized coverage of the military actions of the partisans; thus *Tito* does not provide military details. However, there is much sound material on the political development of the country. And of perhaps paramount interest is the detailed story of the mechanisms set up by Stalin to take over the present Soviet satellites. Any understanding of modern Yugoslavia may start with a study of this book.

Reviewed by LtCol V. J. Croizat

Military Justice . . .

MILITARY JUSTICE UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE—BrigGen James Snedeker, 1043 pages. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. \$15.00

Here is the logical book-shelf companion to *Manual for Courts-Martial*. The author, a retired Marine brigadier general, has succeeded in producing the first exhaustive work on military justice since the enactment of the Uniform Code.

The publication is unique in that it is not limited in scope to one branch of the Armed Forces. An elaborate system of footnotes cross-references the text to Articles for the Government of the Navy, Articles of War, Decisions of the Judge Advocate General of the Army, Navy Court-Martial Orders, and many other standard works in addition to MCM and UCMJ. The organization of this book generally parallels that of the *Manual for Courts-Martial*, making cross-referencing between the two books a surprisingly easy task.

Thirty-seven chapters cover every pertinent subject from the authority and sources of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. "Basic Elements of Offenses" is a chapter in itself and a chapter each is devoted to absence offenses, non-compliance with duties or orders, offenses by means of disrespectful language or deportment, those affecting the public interest, offenses against the person, and ones against property.

General Snedeker's experience in military justice has been both varied and practical. He has Doctor of Laws and Doctor of Juridical Science degrees from George Washing-

Your MARINE CORPS EXCHANGE UNIFORM SHOP




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2 Great Policies for Marine Corps Personnel

ton Law School, and six years of his military career were spent in the office of the Judge Advocate General. This wealth of experience is reflected in the careful attention he gives to such troublesome problems as the drafting of charges and specifications, jurisdiction as to persons, and pre-trial procedure.

Certainly every legal specialist, regardless of branch of service, will find this book a worthwhile addition to his professional library, but probably its greatest value is to the general duty officer who finds himself assigned to court-martial duties. Here he will find not only the rules but also the reasons behind them and references to standard citable documents. The wealth of information contained in the book and its convenient format do much to make the \$15.00 price tag less prohibitive than it appears at first glance.

Reviewed by Capt Ralph M. Head

Books on Parade

The River And The Gauntlet S. L. A. Marshall. The story of the defeat of the 8th Army by Chinese Communist Forces. The first full report on the entry of the Chinese Communists into the Korean war. \$5.00

A Window In Red Square Frank Rounds, Jr. Eighteen months inside an enigma. A brilliant story of a young American in Moscow. \$3.00

Gamesmanship Steven Potter. The art of winning games without actually cheating. A humorous book combining a lot of common sense with diabolical, psychological warfare designed to throw your opponent off his game. \$2.75

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